

Contemporary Review

incorporating THE FORTNIGHTLY

No. 1076 AUGUST 1955

Disarmament Prospects	M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P.
Some Far Eastern Myths	SIR JOHN PRATT
Berlin Revisited after two Decades	DR. EDGAR STERN RUBARTH
Nine Russian Marshals	K. FRANK FELDMAN
Compensation for Nazi Victims	DR. NORMAN BENTWICH
The Character of Louis XV—II	G. P. GOOCH, D.LITT., F.B.A.
Harrison Ainsworth	BRYAN BEVAN
Spain on the Up-Grade	K. SMOGORZEWSKI
Indonesia Today	DAVID INGBER
Medieval Tales	MAX GORDON
Albania under Communism	J. SWIRE
Poles in Exile	S. KLECZKOWSKI
Federal Solutions within the Commonwealth	W. H. GUTTERIDGE
The Social Importance of Trade Unions	GABRIEL BYRNE
Kensington Gardens in Summer— <i>A Poem</i>	A. N. GILKES

Literary Supplement—Contributors : Dr. G. P. Gooch, Frederick Hertz, A. de Montmorency, Béla Menczer, The Rev. B. C. Plowright, Irene Marinoff, B. Evan Owen Dr. Helen Rosenau, Dr. E. Bramsted, Joseph Braddock, John Eales, Grace Banyard.

Price 3/6d. 45/- per annum. U.S.A. \$9.50

ALL CLASSES OF INSURANCE TRANSACTED
MOTOR UNION INSURANCE LTD.
COMPANY LTD.
10, ST. JAMES'S STREET, LONDON, S.W.1

THE WORLD TODAY

CONTENTS OF THE MAY 1955 ISSUE

NOTES OF THE MONTH

Quemoy and Matsu as seen from Washington; Politics and the Presidential Election in Italy; School Segregation in the United States

THE HARD ROAD TO AN AUSTRIAN TREATY

TRADE BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET BLOC

THE POLITICAL SCENE IN FINLAND

THE INDUSTRIAL COLOUR BAR IN THE NORTHERN RHODESIA COPPERBELT

Monthly. 2s. per copy. 25s. per year.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Chatham House, 10 St James's Square, London, S.W.1.

It is only through regular surveys that one may easily be kept informed of the events which occur in tropical and sub-tropical countries.

Annual surveys

in turn political, economic social and cultural
and translated into English when they concern French—
and Spanish—speaking territories
are published, along with documents and articles related
to a central theme,

in the bilingual quaterly journal

CIVILISATIONS

Edited by

**The International Institute of Differing Civilizations,
11, Boulevard de Waterloo, Brussels, Belgium**

160 p. per issue

Annual subscriptions : \$ 5.00 ;
36 s. ; 19 fls. ; D.M. 22

Contemporary Review

incorporating THE FORTNIGHTLY

CONTRIBUTIONS will be considered for publication and should be addressed to the Editor, *Contemporary Review*, 46 Chancery Lane, W.C.2, England.

SUBSCRIPTIONS are charged at the rate of 45s. per annum post free, or \$9.50 in the U.S. and Canada. A single copy costs 3s. 6d. (3s. 9d. including postage) \$1.00 in the U.S. and Canada. Orders may be placed with newsagents, booksellers or subscription agents, or may be sent direct with the appropriate remittance to the Circulation Manager, *Contemporary Review*, 46 Chancery Lane, London, W.C.2, England.

ADVERTISEMENTS. Suitable advertisers' announcements are accepted for publication. Orders and advertisement copy should be received by the 15th of the month preceding the date of publication and should be addressed to the Advertisement Manager, *Contemporary Review*, 46 Chancery Lane, London, W.C.2, England (Telephone Holborn 6201).

LIST OF CONTENTS

AUGUST, 1955

Page

Disarmament Prospects	M. PHILIPS PRICE, M.P.	74
Some Far Eastern Myths	SIR JOHN PRATT	78
Berlin Revisited after two Decades	DR. EDGAR STERN RUBARTH	82
Nine Russian Marshals	K. FRANK FELDMAN	84
Compensation for Nazi Victims	DR. NORMAN BENTWICH	88
The Character of Louis XV—II	G. P. GOOCH, D.LITT., F.B.A.	92
Harrison Ainsworth	BRYAN BEVAN	96
Spain on the Up-Grade	K. SMOGORZEWSKI	100
Indonesia Today	DAVID INGBER	104
Medieval Tales	MAY GORDON	106
Albania under Communism	J. SWIRE	110
Poles in Exile	S. KLECZKOWSKI	113
Federal Solutions within the Commonwealth	W. H. GUTTERIDGE	115
The Social Importance of Trade Unions	GABRIEL BYRNE	120
Kensington Gardens in Summer— <i>A Poem</i>	A. N. GILKES	123

Literary Supplement—Contributors: Dr. G. P. Gooch, Frederick Hertz, A. de Montmorency, Béla Menczer, The Rev. B. C. Plowright, Irene Marinoff, B. Evan Owen, Dr. Helen Rosenau, Dr. E. Bramsted, Joseph Braddock, John Eales, Grace Banyard.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

46-47 CHANCERY LANE · LONDON W.C.2

DISARMAMENT PROSPECTS

WHAT are the prospects that the Western World in the course of the next 6 months will be able to take some useful step towards a *détente* with the Communist world? There can be little doubt that the knowledge of the effect of the Hydrogen bomb which began to penetrate public opinion in the West about 18 months ago has stimulated a certain reasonableness all round. Moreover that stimulant has not been without its effect on the Communist countries either. The rulers of the Kremlin may not let their people know much of what is going on in the outer world but they are as realistic as anyone else and know that it is small consolation for the cities of Great Britain to be laid waste, if the same thing happens in Russia. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that the chances of something coming out of the Geneva Conference are better than they have been with former conferences.

Other forces besides the Hydrogen bomb are also at work in Russia which may be assisting towards the same end. First of all it is clear that the government changes in Russia leading to the retirement of Malenkov and the coming of Bulganin and Krushchev has not reversed foreign policy in the direction of Stalinite intransigence once more. It is true there has been a drop in the emphasis on consumers' goods and an increase in the emphasis on heavy industrial goods. This has probably as much to do with peace-time capital economic development as it has to do with armaments. Indeed on the foreign affairs front Russia appears to have been trying to exercise a restraining influence on the Chinese especially in connection with the Formosa Straits. Moscow almost certainly does not want things driven to a crisis in the Far East. It is more on the home front that the effect of the new government's policy is best seen. Judging by the statements of Krushchev the leaders in the Kremlin seem seriously concerned with the state of Russian agriculture and generally about the long term food situation. For the population of Russia goes on rising, industries go on expanding, mining output rises but the production of food does not rise in proportion. The rate of increase of farm production in Russia is much lower than the increase in industrial output, while as for the livestock industry the number of farm animals in Russia today is not even up to the level it was at in the last days of the Tsars' Empire. Russia in fact is becoming a meat importer.

Various attempts have been made to deal with this situation in recent years. Krushchev himself has for long been an advocate of the "Agro-town," the town whose population farms in a mechanised way a vast area of land around it. This revolutionary method was opposed by many of his colleagues and a compromise seems to have been reached whereby existing collective farms have been brought together in units of 5 or 6 in a sort of super-collective. The usual thing of course has happened. Bureaucratization and the rule of the local official (often party men with little experience of agriculture) has taken place and enthusiasm for collective farming, never very strong even among Russian peasants, has been sagging. Nevertheless there has been a relaxation of some of the food deliveries demanded by the authorities from the collectives and that, it is hoped, will stimulate activity. Moreover 30,000 experts and party men have been sent to the villages

during the last year.

The other enterprise which has been undertaken has been to mobilise large numbers of Communist youth to establish state farms and grow corn on a large scale in Kazakhstan, that vast area of steppe lying between Western Siberia and Russian Turkestan. It is hoped in this way to greatly increase the output of grain for the whole country. But it remains to be seen if this will happen on a scale needed to solve the food problem in Russia. It must be remembered that rainfall in this area is very low and the land was for centuries occupied by Tartar nomads who successfully raised large flocks of livestock here. The Communist policy of abolishing nomadism caused these Tartars, the Kazaks, to leave their homes and flee to China and finally to India, while those who survived finally took refuge in Turkey. Western experts take the view that the whole plan is risky and that much will depend upon the rainfall in the next few years as to whether these state farms will succeed.

It is however clear that these and other difficulties are quite enough, along with the Hydrogen bomb, to cause the rulers of Russia to become rather more amenable in foreign affairs than they have been in the more immediate past. The ultimate aim of the Russian Communists cannot of course be abandoned. Salvation to humanity through World Revolution must remain part of their creed. But it has also been part of the Communist philosophy, which Lenin first practised over the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Kaiser's Germany in January, 1918, that tactical retreats are always permissible when World Revolution comes up against superior force. We are probably in such a phase in the development of Russian foreign policy today. Also the individual leaders in the Kremlin have not got megalomaniac tendencies as Stalin had. Russia has probably ended a phase like that of the reign of Nicolas I or Alexander III—unimaginative personal dictatorships in which the Communist theory provides the ideological background, just as the idea of the autocracy preserving Holy Russia and the Slav idea was the driving force behind the Tsars' dictatorship. Just as Tsarist rule could become mild after a ruthless period, so today the Communist oligarchy can become milder after an era of repression at home and aggression abroad. The signs point in this direction and the West can congratulate itself that it has helped to bring this about because it has organised its defences under NATO and has refused to be provoked into internal divisions and, what the Kremlin wants more than anything else, the isolation of the United States.

The international situation has given a chance to those countries who have set themselves up neutralists between the Western and the Communist camps. Yugoslavia has shown herself recently to belong to this category since Tito's visit to Mr. Nehru. The Yugoslavs however give one the impression that they are under no illusions. They have had experience of Russian Communism which Nehru has never had. One feels that their neutrality is conditioned by a healthy consciousness of proximity to a powerful Northern neighbour and a determination that Yugoslav Communism shall be a national and not an international expression. Moreover Yugoslavia has reinsured herself by joining a military convention with Turkey and Greece. Mr. Nehru's neutralism on the other hand is no doubt sincerely based on a belief that he can successfully mediate between the

Western and the Communist worlds. But he is known to have blind spots in his make-up. Kashmir of course is one of them. The other is the emotion that colours his thinking that Western Imperialism still exists and is as great a danger as Russian Communism. India of course has never been directly threatened by Russia and the defence of South East Asia and the Middle East, the approaches to India, has largely fallen on the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions of the Commonwealth and Turkey. India is therefore free under the protection of others to pursue a neutralism on her own account. In this present phase of international affairs she may possibly play a role in curbing the expansionist tendencies of the Chinese republic and rubbing off some of the rough edges of the Americans. But she would do well to keep her fingers out of the Middle East and leave that region to her neighbour, Pakistan. In this part of Asia the Turco-Iraq Treaty and the accession to it of Great Britain has now laid the foundations of a defence system in the Middle East which may in time effectively protect the oil fields of the Gulf and the peaceful towns and villages of Persia and the Arab lands. The signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the settlement over the Suez Canal was the signal for Iraq to take her own line on Middle East defence issues. Up till then she felt bound to follow Egypt's lead but with the signing of the Treaty Egypt has lost her monopoly of leadership in the Arab world and can no longer call on the Arab countries with Hashemite dynasties to support her against a Western Imperialism which no longer exists.

The most important part of the discussion which will take place at the "Summit" Conference at Geneva will of course concern Europe. But South East Asia will not be without repercussions on the European scene. The time is coming when preparations should be begun for free elections in Viet Nam. The issue will be whether the people of Indo-China want to join Communist Viet-Minh or not. But civil war is going on in Viet Nam between Government forces and partisans and there is friction between the French and the Americans out there which the British are doing all they can to allay. The Viet Nam Government, not having been a signatory to the Geneva armistice agreement last year, refuses to be bound by the promise to hold free elections at all. Yet we, the Americans and the French are committed. The resulting deadlock is not going to make it so easy for us to appear in a white sheet in Geneva and ask for free elections in Germany.

What then are the prospects for the "Summit" Conference at Geneva? Certainly as far back as the middle of May the Russians began to give the impression that their foreign policy had got a "new look." They were going no more to demand the immediate prohibition of all atomic weapons—a demand of course which would completely hamstring American air power, Atomic weapons were to be under a solemn pledge to be used only "for purposes of defence against aggression." Instead of a reduction of conventional armed forces by a fixed percentage for each country, there was to be a formula for reduction and the greatest at least in its initial stages was to be undertaken by Russia. The formula would mean that Russia would demobilise about one and a half million men, the United States 700,000 and Great Britain 100,000. This concession throws overboard much of what the Russians have insisted on up to date. On the other

hand the price to be paid for all this is at its face value quite unacceptable. It envisages that British forces must withdraw from Europe and the Americans not only from Europe but from Britain as well. American bases in the Pacific, the Far East and North Africa are to be abandoned. The whole network of the NATO organisation is to be given up. All that will be left in West Europe will be the French, Belgian and Dutch armies and a possible German army of limited strength at some future time. The Russian army, though considerably reduced in size, will be there in Eastern Europe as before. Of course the West cannot possibly accept such proposals but assuming that this is the usual Muscovite attempt to "try it on the dog" there is no reason to get disheartened about this. There are possibilities for negotiation here and, provided the West remains firm and united and goes on building up its forces round NATO, there is no reason at all why some further concession could not be obtained which might have the basis of a settlement. The West might agree to withdraw its forces from the Rhine to some line farther West and nearer the coast. No doubt an arrangement with Dr. Adenauer about this could be made. The West in fact must do something more than just block the more outrageous demands of the Russians. They must put some concrete proposal forward and such might very well be a withdrawal farther West in return for a Russian concession on the atomic bomb and an all-round reduction of land forces according to the Russian formula. The Russians of course will fight hard and every inch of the way but in view of the internal problems that Russia has to solve and in view of the much increased strength of the Western world in recent years they may quite well decide that the time has come for some further compromise. Probably it will not come this time at Geneva but the ground may possibly be prepared for it there.

We must of course take Germany into account in all this. It cannot be expected that the country which has now completely recovered its economic strength by a process of unrestricted private enterprise in industry, low wages and living standards and hard work by all can be left without consultation in these matters. Russian policy in regard to Germany seems unchanged. She will agree to unification if Germany comes out of the Western orbit. Here again is a point on which the West cannot give way. Germany today having obtained her sovereignty and liberty in the Western Federation has a right to choose what she will do. As far as anything can be foreseen, she will stay with the West. Moreover Germany will not agree to unification at the price of becoming disarmed and neutral, for this would only mean that she would become a satellite of Russia. On the other hand the West ought to make concession on this point by Russia easy. German armed forces must be limited and she must not have atomic weapons. Would Germany accept this? For the sake of unity almost certainly yes. Then again unification might not come at once but there might be an interim period during which a government comes into existence in East Germany consisting of the representatives of both the East and West German governments and these would prepare for free elections. This would give the Russians a smoke-screen behind which they could retire and drop the Communist government of East Germany. For the Russians must know by now that free elections in East Germany would mean the end of their regime there. By this means we can make it

easy for them to get out.

Russian foreign policy is undergoing overhaul and reorientation. The process may take a long time. The fundamental creed of Russian Communism is that the capitalist world bears the seeds of its own decay on the principle of the Hegelian dialectic. On this thesis foreign policy has been based. In the Russian foreign office it has been heresy to think otherwise than that the standard of living in the West is falling steadily and that the Western powers are ready to fall on one another in an Imperialist war after they have combined in an onslaught on the Soviet Union. Since this has not taken place, since in fact that standard of living of "capitalist" Europe is rising and that of America going forward by giant leaps, since Russia has not been attacked by the West and since the West has not split into quarrelling groups, Moscow must think again. This will not mean that Russian Communists will give up their religion of World Revolution, that Communist Apocalypse, but it does mean the probability of a "peredishka" (breathing space), a *détente* with forces which for a time at least they can neither overthrow nor undermine. M. PHILIPS PRICE.

SOME FAR EASTERN MYTHS

THE Hay Open Door Notes of September, 1899, marked the beginning of a new era in the relations between Britain, America and China. The door had in fact been forced open by Great Britain some sixty years before, and foreign merchants trading in China were no longer restricted to the Factories at Canton. It then became apparent that if any foreign power were allowed to claim a privileged position peculiar to itself it would be difficult to preserve the independence and integrity of China, and it would also be difficult to maintain the overwhelming lead in trade long since established by Great Britain. The menace to both China and Great Britain could only be averted by setting up a regime of the open door with equal opportunity for all. It was accordingly proclaimed to all the world that the privileges which Britain desired and which China was willing to grant were privileges that would be shared by all the world. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, while the flood of imperialist sentiment in both Europe and America was rising ever higher, China continued to bury her head in the sand and pretend that she governed the world. Russia was building the Trans-Siberian railway from the Urals to the Pacific, and when it reached Lake Baikal in 1894 Japan made war on China in order to forestall Russia in Manchuria and Korea. China was defeated and humbled. Her armies fled from every field and her government devoted all its energies to invoking the intervention of foreign powers. The result was that France and Russia devised a scheme of imperialist penetration by means of railways running through the heart of China from the Amur to Indo-China owned and operated, not by commercial interests, but by the two governments concerned; and Germany, inspired by their example, seized a naval base at Kiaochow and obtained a similar concession for a railway from Kiaochow (Tsingtao) to Tsinan the capital of Shantung.

Early in 1898 Lord Salisbury invited the co-operation of America

"in opposing action by foreign powers which may tend to restrict freedom of commerce of all nations in China," but America was engaged in ventures of her own—war with Spain, a gunboat policy in South America, and the annexation of the Philippines and other islands in the Pacific. China was deemed to be "a remote and relatively insignificant province of American enterprise." The reply to Lord Salisbury's overture, therefore, was to the effect that American commerce did not seem to be threatened by the recent developments in China and the United States preferred to avoid "interference or connection with European complications." This attitude was modified when Hay, who had been Ambassador in London, became Secretary of State in Washington. In September, 1899, he wrote notes to the six powers concerned asking for assurances that in all existing or future spheres of influence the Chinese treaty tariff would continue to be levied and that there would be no discrimination as regards harbour dues or railway charges "on railways built, controlled or operated within its sphere." In July, 1900, when the Boxer "rebels," with the connivance of the Manchu Court, were laying siege to the foreign Legations in Peking, Hay wrote a further series of notes in which he suggested that the Powers should seek a solution of the Boxer crisis which should preserve China's territorial and administrative entity. It is significant that he used the word "entity" and not "integrity," for five months later he instructed the American Minister in Peking to demand the cession of a naval base near Foochow the capital of Fokien. The reply to this demand was that China had given an undertaking to Japan that she would not alienate territory in this province to any other power; and the Japanese government reminded Hay of his proposal about preserving China's "entity" and suggested that "that desired end might best be attained if those powers who entertained similar views refrained from accepting any advantage which might give other powers a pretext for territorial demands."

Hay was applauded at the time as the hero who had stood up to the Great Powers and "secured written pledges of our treaty rights good in the event of complete partition." Nevertheless deeply rooted in the American mind is the myth that Hay had saved China from dismemberment, and his notes of September, 1899, are always described as the Open Door notes. The self-deception which gives rise to myths of this kind arises from a not unnatural desire to represent the actions of one's own country in as favourable a light as possible, a failing to which the British are no less liable than the Americans. In such matters as the Opium War or the invasion of Tibet in 1904 (to give only two examples) the myths that are propagated by learned Societies in this country are no less fantastic than the myth about America and the open door, but what is so curious about the open door myth is that it has been propagated as assiduously in England as in America. The explanation is to be found in the field of world affairs.

In nineteenth century Europe there was a criss-cross of alliances, generally for some evil purpose, but England held aloof from the groups into which Europe was divided, for it was generally agreed that the right policy for England was, not to tie herself to the policy of any other government, but to be "the champion of justice and right, giving the weight of her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks that wrong has been done." The collapse of China before the onslaught of Japan encouraged

members of these groups to extend their activities in the Far East and it was just at this time that America, emerging from isolationism, seemed likely to play a dominant role in the Pacific. Very few people realise that Americans disapprove of Great Britain and her Empire, and feel humiliated by the memory that their country was formerly a colonial possession of that Empire. In the Far Eastern crisis Englishmen were eager to believe that America was on their side and would help to bring about conditions that would favour the expansion of China's foreign trade. This induced in many people a sort of bogus idealism (if that is not too unkind a term) which caused them to put the worst interpretation possible on the policy of their own government while accepting at face value the high flown declarations of American politicians who stood on the side lines and criticised other countries—especially Great Britain—for not acting on the noble principles proclaimed by the government in Washington but which that government never itself made any attempt to carry out. It was these bogus idealists who declared that England had carved out a sphere of influence in the Yangtse region though in fact Lord Salisbury had insisted that no power should be allowed to obtain a sphere in that region. And in 1931 they invented the story that America proposed that strong measures should be taken to check Japanese aggression in Manchuria and that Britain refused, whereas in fact, as Mr. Stimson himself has told us, President Hoover objected to the use of sanctions and Mr. Stimson, his Secretary of State, then discovered that moral condemnation was an effective substitute for sanctions.

It was the Far Eastern crisis that finally induced the British Government to abandon the tradition of a national policy based on truth and honour—the policy described by Lord Salisbury as *Splendid Isolation*—and to make a treaty of alliance with Japan. This policy won the approval of Theodore Roosevelt, and all the expectations of the bogus idealists would seem to have been realised when America became an unsigned member of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This grouping of the powers had the same evil consequences in Asia as the Anglo-French entente had in Europe. War was now inevitable, but the policy of the alliance was based on the belief that if Japan were backed by Britain and America war between Russia and Japan would end in stalemate and that this would bring about a balance of power and stable conditions in the east. Never in high politics has there been so disastrous a miscalculation. Japan's overwhelming victory over Russia electrified all Asia and confirmed the Japanese in the belief that it was their manifest destiny to spread the blessings of Kodo—the rule of the Divine Emperor—over all neighbouring lands.

In China the national revival had begun some ten years earlier, but the nationalists failed to realise that the menace to the independence and integrity of China now came, not from colonialism or the imperialism of the west, but from the mounting ambitions of Japan. The Americans had no illusions on this subject. They knew that at any moment Japan might launch an attack upon the Philippines, and for the next forty years the aim of American policy was to divert the expansionist ambitions of Japan from the islands of the Southern Seas to the mainland of Asia. To use a homely metaphor which Americans will understand, China was sold down the river in order to appease Japan, and as usual the blame was put on England

while America stood virtuously aside. The policy of appeasement began with two agreements signed in 1905 and 1908 by which Japan was given a free hand in Korea and Manchuria in return for an undertaking not to attack the Philippines. When the first world war broke out in 1914 a Japanese army landed on Chinese territory in Shantung and seized Kiaochow and the railway built by the Germans. Four months later when Japan presented the famous (or infamous) Twenty One Demands, which were designed to turn China into a vassal state, President Wilson declined to intervene and his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, expressly recognised that "Japan has special interests in China particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." By the Lansing-Ishii notes of 1917 this policy was confirmed. Shantung was now included in the same category as Manchuria as a field for Japanese expansion, and some recognition was accorded to Japanese pretensions in Fukien and South China. The Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931 was the natural development of the train of events set in motion by America's policy of appeasement. The Kuomintang government of China, like its predecessor of 1894, buried its head in the sand and devoted all its energies to invoking the assistance of foreign powers. It appealed to the League of Nations and M. Briand remarked that the Chinese showed their devotion to the principles of the Covenant by the rapidity with which their armies disappeared whenever the aggressor approached. President Hoover and Secretary Stimson insisted that moral disapproval would be a more effective deterrent than sanctions either military or economic, and the League of Nations obediently went through the solemn farce of expressing moral disapproval. In 1937, when Japan staged an incident at the Marco Polo Bridge and started her eight year all-out war against China, the American delegates to the Brussels Conference in October, 1937, announced that America would "share in the common effort to devise a means of finding a pacific solution." During the next four years Japan was allowed to purchase in America two thirds of the war materials she required to wage a war of conquest in China, and America bought gold from Japan to the value of fifty millions sterling.

This is not the place to tell the grim story of the evils inflicted on China by the use of American money to maintain in power the most cruel, corrupt and incompetent administration that even China has ever known; or to explain how it came about that, when that administration disintegrated in 1949 and the remnant of the Kuomintang fled with their loot to Formosa the United Nations, with the acquiescence of Great Britain, continued to recognise them as the government of China entitled to occupy China's permanent seat on the Security Council. Nor is it right that we should sit in judgment on America. Her record in China may be discreditable but it is not more discreditable than the British record elsewhere as those who remember, for example, Morocco and Abyssinia, the Stresa front, the Hoare-Laval plan and Munich will be ready to admit. And America has many magnificent achievements to her credit. What is important is that we should bear in mind that much of the responsibility for the crimes and errors committed in the Far East rests on us.

It is the people who decide what road Great Britain is to travel, not the politicians or the Cabinet Ministers, and if we, the people, had protested

against the policy of selling China down the river the important sections of informed opinion in America who feel strongly on this matter might also have found it possible to make their voices heard. Throughout this dismal period there has been no indication that America ever thought it was desirable to take heed of public opinion in Great Britain. It was assumed as a matter of course that Britain would follow wherever America might lead. That is why the Kuomintang on Formosa is accepted as the government of China. It is not too late to return to the policy of holding aloof from the groups into which the world is being divided. Nehru and Chou En-Lai are now travelling the road marked out by Canning, Palmerston, Disraeli, Gladstone and Salisbury. Let us follow their example.

J. T. PRATT.

BERLIN REVISITED: AFTER TWO DECADES

ONE should not see again the beloved one after an interval during which both she and oneself have aged. The shock may become unbearable, if not merely the mellowing years but catastrophes have meanwhile disfigured the cherished familiar traits, which, in the case of a beloved city, may never have been really beautiful but had imprinted themselves upon one's heart because of a hundred deep-rooted associations, the sound of voices, the memory of joys, or just because one was young. After avoiding Berlin, that island city surrounded by a weird Sarmatian-Asiatic world, for 19 years, I gave in to an academic appeal. Now I have lost for good that spiritual home whence I had started as a European, a citizen of the world. Or have I? Are all those lights, red, green, blue and yellow whose pearly lines crop up at night—after a flight over totally dark, drab, plains, moonlike and Sovietized—when one is nearing the former German capital from Hamburg, just childish boasts of the 2½ million West Berliners living on the brink of a volcano? Or is their seemingly total indifference to the precariousness of their situation, their unconsciously ironical attitude towards Russians and Westerners, including Bonn and the present set up of their fellow-countrymen in the Federal Republic, proof of a profound and sincere faith in the future; of that old Cockney assurance of the irrepressible Berliner: "You'll have to come to us, somehow, some time!" They certainly never look back; they show you what has been accomplished to overcome the ruins, the splitting off of well-nigh half the former city, with all its former centres, its scarce historical remnants of the Middle Ages and the earlier Hohenzollern period, and more than a third of its population; and they tell you enthusiastically of what is planned or begun to make the new Western Berlin.

It is impressive enough in many ways. For they have shifted the life-centre—once between the wide, fastidious Unter den Linden from the Brandenburg gate to the (razed) Imperial Palace, and the Potsdamer Platz, with the shopping area of the Friedrich—and the Leipziger Strasse, the government piles old and new in the Wilhelmstrasse—to the far-away borough of Steglitz. The same old familiar department, clothing, and fashion stores, the same smart show windows there turn up, often in improvised, or somewhat hastily and economically erected buildings of not

unpleasant, modern, simplified lines. They have created, in the nearly undamaged garden-suburb of Dahlem amidst its former research institutes, a new intellectual centre culminating in a complex of brand-new University buildings for which Henry Ford Jnr. gave two million dollars, and the name. It is, already, with over 6,000 students and the most beautiful and up-to-date scientific apparel I have seen all over the world, one of the most impressive on Earth, and leaves far behind the old, damaged and now "Russified" Humboldt University Unter den Linden, once the spiritual home of the Hegel, Grimm, Virchow, Helmholtz, Einstein, Planck, Sauerbruch, etc., and my own Alma Mater. Its exodus, in 1948, was preceded by that of the local government, liberal and democratic ever since the 1848 revolution in spite of Prussian or Wilhelmian reactionary trends; this now resides, combined local and Land government and parliament under the Bonn constitution, in the former borough town hall of Schoeneberg, a stately and fully reconstructed pile.

The Kurfuerstendamm, a broad, once gay thoroughfare, a Berlin cross-breed between Soho and the Paris Boulevards, still glitters and twinkles at night, and its cafés and restaurants, its cabarets and theatres are crowded. But in the merciless light of the day its looks like the jaw of an old woman who has forgotten her denture, and shows, here and there between a few still serviceable stumps, a brand-new, artificial crown. It is symptomatic for the dour humour of the Berliners that they suggest a preservation of the sorely mutilated tower of the neo-romanesque Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial church as a war monument, and that they repair the ugly, over-ornamented housefronts where possible, while huge, sober, modern bank, insurance and office palaces spring up, ten, twelve and more floors high, between them, intermingled with one-floor, makeshift shop-buildings. Yet all have brilliant, artistic show windows, and there is a bustling, yet not at all hectic life. There are still the luxurious cafés and sweet shops, crowded with women in all their fineries and some stern men with attaché cases; and still one can have a good meal, well presented, for less money than in any other metropolis. The likewise unparalleled cheap transport system may have to do with that ever fluctuating life; for still about 3 pence buy a ticket permitting a ride all over the huge city, in underground or overhead trains, trams and buses, including one change-over from one to another.

It seems absurd that one may take an underground train, somewhere in the American or British sector and, by not paying attention to the stops, emerge in the middle of the Russian-controlled, eastern one; for overhead there are barriers, warnings, police, and yonder are highly militarised, trigger-happy Communist guards, kidnappings, arrests, and occasional shootings. It is a different city, another world; drab-looking people do not stroll but silently go for a definite purpose, women with kerchiefs instead of hats, men with rough cloth or leather jackets, and many of the rare vehicles are horse-drawn. Instinctively one would expect even ox-carts to turn up as somewhere, far east. The enormous Soviet embassy dominates the Linden, well proportioned yet somehow with an eastern flavour created by its unnecessary, huge top; and the same applies to the avenue of towering workers' tenements in the North, re-named after Stalin. Yet, the people there are the same Berliners as this side of the

fence and communicate with one another disregarding the risks; until, between 10,000 and 30,000 every month, they cross the line to the West for the last time, for good.

Nothing, however, enhances the tragedy, the incongruousness of the jigsaw puzzle that used to be the world's third greatest city more poignantly than a ride along the wide avenue now called after the heroic workers' revolt against the Communist rule in 1953, "Street of 17th June." For the beautiful Tiergarten, Berlin's 640 acres park in the midst of urban bustle, is no more; between a few isolated groups of its huge trees tiny nursery trees have but just replaced the pitiful war and postwar allotments where people grew a few potatoes or cabbages; and approaching the Brandenburg gate, deprived of its proud quadriga and showing a red flag, first the arrogant Russian war memorial—on British controlled soil—then the huge, empty shell of the Reichstag, and finally police and signboards warning us "You now leave the western sectors." Beyond are ruins, a huge ridge of rubble of what was once the row of government buildings and palaces of the Wilhelmstrasse and their old, well-kept gardens. Yet, here again, Berlin grins at its conquerors and task-masters: freshly gilded, the colossal Victory on its column, 200 feet high, erected after the Franco-German war, glitters in sunshine.

Nazis? The Berliner chuckles: "We have been had once, with our regard for uniforms, march music and pageants implanted by ten generations of Hohenzollern rulers. The unconverted ones are now over there, persuading themselves that it is the same thing, N.M.V.D. for Gestapo, Peoples Police for Storm Troopers, hammer and sickle for the swastika in the same red flag. We want to outlive, to outwit, not to outshoot any more our sortie from a siege which keeps the eyes of the world upon us." Ernst Reuter, the Socialist Lord Mayor, who died so early in the middle of a work respected by friend and foe, is their hero; no autocrat, crowned or uncrowned, any more. Their heraldic bear carries a mural crown, and their symbol is the queer monument of the Anglo-American Air Lift of 1948-49: half a bridge's arch standing in front of the magnificent air port in the heart of the town. When leaving from there, once more, I felt that I left behind something infinitely brave and human amidst all that insanity. Is Berlin, perhaps, the citadel of sanity of an insane world?

EDGAR STERN-RUBARTH.

NINE RUSSIAN MARSHALS

NINE marshals may change the course of history—Marshals Bulganin, Zhukov, Konev, Sokolovsky, Wassilevsky, Budjenny, Rokossovsky, Timoshenko and Voroshilov. The ninth, known by intimates as Comrade Klim, is a senile old man whose real powers are negligible, albeit he is nominally Russia's President. As a strategist he could hardly be ranked as being above-average. The 74-year-old nestor of the marshals is ailing. He lacks initiative and now that Stalin is no more, his influence is indeed exiguous. He was one of the late dictator's closest cronies. Stalin esteemed his organising flair. He played a major role in mechanising the Red Army and he saw to it that Russia built up a powerful armoured force.

But in the field he failed miserably. Stalin had a weak spot for him nevertheless and he never had cause to doubt Voroshilov's loyalty.

Konstantin Rokossovsky is of a different kind. He really does have a Polish ancestry. When Stalin made him a Marshal of Poland he guaranteed Russia's mastery over the satellite at least during Rokossovsky's tenure. Unlike the others Rokossovsky is a gentleman. He is a lover of horses and good food. He excels as a conversationalist and those who have listened to him for half an hour admit without grudge that there is hardly another man in Poland who can compare with him as a raconteur of witty stories. Hostesses vie with each other in sending him invitations. Rokossovsky left the Red Army formally in 1949 when he was "lent" to Poland indefinitely. The gift was received with mixed feelings. Rokossovsky did not beat about the bush. He exalted himself to the position of viceroy and has steadfastly held on to his job. This does not prevent him from pursuing the most unproletarian delights such as visiting the opera and ballet.

The debonair marshal was never keen to be given the job of co-ordinating the eastern bloc's armies and made no bones about it. So Marshal Konev got that appointment. Ivan Stepanovitch Konev is 58 and of peasant stock. His mother brought him forth in the bleak Archangel district, and he had to cut wood early so that the family could eat. His conscription into the Tsarist armies impoverished the family to such a degree that it is hardly surprising that the Communist creed of world revolution fascinated him. In 1926 he completed the course for commanding personnel at the Frunze Military Academy. The war against Germany gave Konev a chance to show his mettle. His operations were so successful that he was twice named a Hero of the Soviet Union and awarded three orders of Lenin. Significantly Konev presided over the court that condemned the secret police chief Lavrenty Beria. In plain language this means he led the army's revolt against the NKVD terror that scourged the countryside. And Konev was well aware of the danger that threatened to topple the army pyramid. So he struck. Khrushchev, the party secretary whose life was saved by Konev's allegiance to the party to which he has belonged since 1918, has rewarded him by making him C.-in-C. of the satellite armies. This gives Konev a command of 550,000 Poles, 250,000 Czechs, 170,000 Hungarians, 178,000 Bulgarians, 60,000 Albanians and a possible 150,000 East Germans, as well as 250,000 ill-paid and ill-clothed Roumanians. Konev could also call upon the 700,000 militiamen and security troops in these puppet states. Against this satellite force the West could supply immediately 46 divisions which are attached to NATO. Another 46 are earmarked for NATO. The barrel-chested Konev is not easily perturbed. He can command armies with great skill and he is well in with the politicians in Moscow. That assures his position. Zhukov gets on with him and he is respected among the younger officers.

71-year-old Marshal Budjenny is the buffoon among the marshals. Countless funny stories are told of him. His chief claim to fame is his moustache. Semjon Budjenny is a Quixotic figure whom one almost expects to charge at windmills at any time. He came up the hard way. He served as a sergeant major in the days of the Tsar and has never quite lost his swashbuckling mien. But the Saporoshje-Cossack will hardly

play a prominent part in the fateful decisions of the marshals. He is the glory of fast equestrians of the steppes, a faintly romantic figure who will just fade away. Hitler's armies inflicted crushing defeats on him, but perhaps it would be unfair to blame him unduly for these setbacks. The armies under his control in 1941 were far too close to the frontier, thus depriving themselves of manoeuvring space. And Budjenny did not know what hit him when the panzers cracked his thin front.

On the other hand, the bull-like Ukrainian Semjon Timoshenko, known as "Tim," is still very much in evidence in the councils of the marshals. He commands the western front and enjoys a firm reputation as a shrewd strategist who can move armies dexterously over spacious plains. Timoshenko has abandoned his rivalry with Zhukov and this has stood him in good stead.

Politically unassailable is Marshal Alexander Wassilevsky, deputy Minister of Defence. He fancies himself as an ideologue and propitiously propounded the theory in the 'thirties that politicians not soldiers should command. This view endeared him to Stalin. Later Wassilevsky was derisively known as Marshal Molotov because of his close friendship with the Soviet foreign minister. In the rough and tumble of the revolution Wassilevsky, an ex-lieutenant of the Tsar, advised Molotov and later this common cause of yore forged a strong bond between the two. Wassilevsky may be obsequious, but he is no fool. In 1943 Stalin made him chief of his general staff at 54. He was right at the top. In 1949 Bulganin replaced him as minister of defence. After Stalin's death he dropped out of the running somewhat and had to be content with a routine job under the new defence chief. Little of Wassilevsky's antecedents is known but he has proved himself a suave and courteous negotiator. Presumably he comes from Poland like Rokossovsky.

Marshal Vassili Sokolovsky is a poor diplomat but in inverse proportion an excellent soldier. He was practically unknown to the West until 1946 when Stalin promoted him marshal and made him successor to Zhukov in Germany. Sokolovsky is a hard man to deal with. He is a Communist dialectic who is always prepared to listen to his political adviser. A Russian biographer reveals that he comes of a poor family. This is believed to be untrue. He has very cultivated but not stilted manners. Those who have delved into his pedigree think his forebears were Polish gentry. At all events he fought as a lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian armies and was decorated for bravery. His name will always be linked with the Berlin Blockade. It proved a complete failure and Sokolovsky became known among his own underlings somewhat sardonically as "marshal of the air lift." Stalin did not blame the fiasco on him and even saw to it that he was made a deputy minister of defence in 1949.

Georgy Zhukov, whose star is again shining so brightly, used to cut a dashing figure in his black tunic, blue breeches and patent-leather kepi with bronze double eagle, the badge of the Tsar. He has put on some weight since those intrepid days in the dragoons, but he is still an impressive figure. One need cherish no false illusions about him. He is a full-fledged Communist and used to argue with Eisenhower for hours on the merits of Russia's system. Like Konev, Marshal Zhukov is a full member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party. He has served under

most of the marshals to whom he now gives orders: Timoshenko who commanded the cavalry regiment in the Revolution to which Zhukov belonged; Budjenny who led the army of which the regiment was a part; Voroshilov who directed operations at Stalingrad (then called Tsaritsyn) where Zhukov was wounded. When Zhukov attended lectures at Frunze Academy in Moscow his instructor Borish Shaposhnikov thought him "slow on the uptake." Nonetheless, he recommended that Zhukov should study German precision under General von Seeckt, the creator of the black Reichswehr. In Belorussia Zhukov served under Timoshenko and did his best to polish up the uncouth training methods of the muzhiks. He escaped the purge which devoured 374 generals and 30,000 officers. Instead he inflicted a severe defeat on Japan's 6th army and was made Hero of the Soviet Union. During the last war Zhukov created the Stavka, a staff organisation, which smoothed the rough edges of the old irregular generals' plans. Thus an effective staff cadre could be pitted against the vaunted Generalstab of the Germans. Zhukov's troops were just in time to save their commander's family at Strelkovka where sadistic SS troops had imprisoned them in a house and set fire to it. In 1945 General Eisenhower invited Zhukov to visit him in the USA but his star was already sinking. He returned from Moscow saying that he had been ill. "What was wrong?" he was asked sympathetically. "Ear trouble," he said laconically. "I can't come to visit Ike." He disappeared from the scene and sent word from Odessa, the military district which he was sent to command, that all was well. With Stalin's death Zhukov's thralldom was lifted as if by magic. He pledged his loyalty to the new regime and in gratitude was given the assurance that he would be made Minister of Defence. This promise has now been redeemed. But his "shadow" was still there: General Serov, the chief political commissar of the U.S.S.R. Serov has been Zhukov's watchdog all along the tough road to the top. Today Serov has an office near to that of Zhukov. The 58-year-old Zhukov is as robust and taurian as ever. He is extremely popular. His countrymen see in him the saviour of Moscow, the stalwart of Stalingrad, and the conqueror of Berlin. He is a symbol for the whole nation. But this popularity counts for little. Zhukov knows that enmity among the marshals could ruin the whole edifice. Vassilevsky and Voroshilov plotted against him at one time, and he never knew which way the smart Bulganin was going to turn.

Nikolai Bulganin had to be taught the rudiments of military science at Frunze Academy when he was already wearing the shoulder boards of a general. Bulganin who is always spruce and debonair has aged prematurely. He is a very polite and courteous man who likes to pass off an air of well-groomed urbanity. To the ladies he dispenses ingratiating esteem. Incidentally his wife Elena Michailowna is a teacher at Moscow School Number 175. She looks Slav with a broad, goodnatured face, thick dark and parted hair. "We like her," the girl pupils say. "You can always go to her with all your problems." She teaches English, a subject she studied before she met Bulganin and married him in 1924. "It was love at first sight," she says. They had a boy and a girl and when the children were older she continued her studies, took her exams in 1941 and was "drafted" into a school, being urgently needed. The "Bulganina"

has only been out of Russia in 1936 when she accompanied the marshal on a tour of Europe, but she was glad to get home. She is an industrious woman who likes her job. Bulganin is, of course, a mighty man, though his importance should not be overrated. In 1947 Stalin made him defence Minister, placing high confidence in his organising abilities. Two years later, in expectation of the Korean War, he had to hand over to Wassilevsky, the professional soldier. But one cannot dismiss Bulganin as a dilettante. He is a great mediator between party and soldiery. However, Litvinov mediated between East and West successfully and was faded out. Mediators only play a transient role in totalitarian regimes.

K. FRANK FELDMAN.

COMPENSATION FOR NAZI VICTIMS

WHAT is probably the biggest legal process recorded in history is taking place now in hundreds of courts and before hundreds of administrative tribunals all over Western Germany and in Western Berlin. It is concerned with the claims of those persons—and their heirs—who suffered loss of property or liberty, or injury to life, health and profession by the Nazi persecution between 1933 and 1945. The number of persons who have brought claims runs into hundreds of thousands; the amounts involved are many billions of Marks; and the legal process has already been working for six years, and is likely to continue for a longer period.

One of the Allies' war aims, constantly repeated during the war, was to assure to the victims of the Nazis restitution of stolen and confiscated property, and compensation for loss of liberty, health, profession, employment, and other forms of injury. Restitution was a "reserved subject," as it was called, for the occupying Allied Powers, after the surrender of Germany; and that meant that the military governments set up in 1945 could enact legislation about it binding on the German people. For two years it was hoped that a single law on restitution for the four zones, British, American, Russian, and French, would be enacted by the Allied High Commissioners; and many drafts were discussed. Gradually the hope of quadri-partite action was frustrated because of the beginning of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies. Even the hope of a common law for the British, American, and French zones was disappointed. The only uniform action by the three Powers was to exercise control over all property which was the subject of a claim.

The American military government was the first to take effective action, and in 1947 promulgated a law of restitution for the American zone. Soon afterwards the French authorities enacted a law with much the same principles, but considerable difference of detail. The British Military Government did not promulgate its law for the British zone till May, 1949. The City of Berlin, or rather the "Senat" governing Western Berlin, passed a law of restitution in 1950. In every case the laws were to be administered by German Agencies and German Courts, subject to some supervision by the Allied Control, and a final judicial authority of a supreme court of appeal, composed of allied judges in each zone. The laws were

inevitably complicated because of the tortuous dealings with property confiscated or sold under duress, and of the problems caused by changing currencies.

It has been an added difficulty of the whole process of restitution and compensation, that the occupying powers dealt with it piece-meal and separately. Restitution of identifiable property was a matter of their legislation; compensation for loss of liberty, health, profession and the rest was left to the legislation of the German Lands, that is, the provinces of what is now the German Federal Republic. The laws of restitution in each zone were different. So were the laws of compensation in each "Land." At last, in the contractual agreements between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic in 1952, it was stipulated that the Federal Government should enact a comprehensive law of compensation, which should apply to the whole territory. The Allies set a bad example to the German authorities; they gave the impression that they were not wholehearted about fulfilling the promise of rapid restitution. It is not surprising that the German authorities on their side have often been dilatory in executing the laws passed by, or at the instance of, the Allies. The laws were bound to be unpopular, and the persons affected, the restitutors of the property claimed, might hope that, if they postponed long enough the final judgement, a change in the political situation would remove the obligation to restore.

The restitution law in the three zones and in Berlin provides that in the first instance the claim is brought before a Restitution Agency, which tries to bring about an amicable settlement between the claimant and the defendant. The agency is composed of a single German judge. If he is not successful, the claim is referred to a Restitution Chamber of three German judges. There is an appeal from its judgement to the German Court of Appeal, and finally to the Allied Supreme Tribunal. It will be seen then that ample opportunity is given for lengthy litigation and legal delays. Nevertheless, great progress has been made since 1948 in the restitution of property. The amount recovered by individual claimants against individuals, in the American zone alone, approaches one billion Marks, or £80 millions. In the British Zone it is likely that the amount will not be much less. And a large class of property claims has yet to be dealt with in all the zones. It consists of claims against the German Government for movable property, shares, bank accounts, jewellery, and furniture, which was confiscated from Jews and others by the Nazis. The Federal Republic undertook in the agreements with the Western Powers to accept liability, and make restitution for this stolen property, so far as it belonged to persons who lived in Western Germany, and up to the total sum of 1½ billion Marks. It has not yet, after two years, implemented its undertaking to pass the necessary law; and that delay is a matter of general complaint. But the bill has been prepared, and it is hoped that it will be enacted in the near future.

The federal law of compensation ("*Entschädigungsgesetz*"), has been in force for nearly two years in the three western zones. It provides for claims not only by those who are now living, or who formerly lived, in Western Germany, but also by those who were in the Nazi concentration camps in that territory, or who were political and stateless refugees in the displaced

persons' camps in Germany at the end of the war, or who were expelled from countries occupied by the Nazis. An enormous machine has been set up in each province to deal with the tens of thousands of claims which come from all parts of the world. It consists partly of administrative offices and partly of special courts, which have to consider cases that the Administration or the claimants refer to it. In Western Berlin the administrative office occupies a big building next the office of the Western Allies Kommandatur, and numbers nearly one thousand officials. It is examining some 50,000 claims from outside Germany; and there are many more to come. The size of the administrative department in the State (Land) of Bavaria is not much smaller.

The claims are for all manner of injuries, loss of life, health, parents, loss of profession, the breaking of university or other education, the discriminatory taxes imposed on Jews who left Germany. But far the biggest category is of claims for loss of liberty. In each of such cases the claimant must produce evidence of internment in concentration camps and prove the period of internment. Sometimes proof is obtained from the records of the International Tracing Service which has the registers of the German camps that were amazingly preserved. Those records were till this year kept in the small Bavarian town of Arolsen, in an office under Allied direction. When the Federal German Government obtained full sovereignty, they were handed over for safe custody to the International Red Cross. Where the evidence of internment cannot be traced in those records, the claim depends on the evidence of witnesses, and the greatest care has to be exercised to assure that the evidence is trustworthy. Often the claim is by heirs, and the German authorities require strict proof of succession. It is no wonder that the compensation action is expected to take ten years to complete. The amounts which will be ultimately recovered by the claimants is likely to be not less than that granted for restitution of "identifiable property." It is a striking indication of the economic prosperity of Western Germany that the sums due for restitution and compensation to the claimants abroad can now be transferred in foreign currency without restriction.

Recently the Social Democrats, the opposition party, raised a debate in the *Bundestag* attacking the Government for their slowness in carrying out their obligations. It is nearly ten years since the end of the War, and at the present rate of progress it would take another twenty years to complete the work. In the meantime a large proportion of the victims will have died. One of the troubles of the elaborate procedure for restitution and compensation is that German tribunals tend to apply the law not according to the spirit but according to the letter, and take advantage of any legal impediment to recovery. It is an aggravation of the discontents that many ex-Nazis who were in Government service, including war-criminals, are receiving full pensions. The Federal Government cannot plead incapacity to pay. The German economy is prosperous beyond all expectations, and could bear without any strain an increase in the payments.

Another class of the claims for compensation is that lodged by persons who were compelled during the war to do forced labour for German industrialists and suffered terrible treatment. A test case was brought last year against the huge concern of the I. G. Farben. And judgement was

given in favour of the claimant. Since then negotiations have been conducted for a settlement of the claims, but without any positive result. Claims for the benefit of social insurance supplement the claims for compensation. Former inhabitants of Germany, who are now living in Great-Britain, Israel, America or other foreign countries, are entitled to receive abroad the payments for old age, invalidity or the like prescribed by the German law. And the flourishing exchange position of Germany again makes it possible to remit the sums due in foreign currency. The former civil servants of the German government who were discharged under the racial law by Hitler are a favoured class in the immense structure of restitution. They receive a pension which would be due to them, not at the rate of the salary which they were receiving when they were discharged, but at the rate of the estimated rank that they would have reached in the service if they had not been prematurely removed.

Jewish public bodies in England, the United States and Israel have played an important part in helping poor Jewish claimants in all parts of the world to pursue their claims. A body known as the United Restitution Organisation, which has branches in every country with a considerable Jewish population, has taken up these cases and pursued them with the German authorities. To-day the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany, which was associated with the State of Israel in the negotiations with the German Government in 1952, has taken the responsibility for financing the restitution organisation. Trustee corporations, also, formed in England, America and France, have claimed the property of those persons in Germany, victims of the persecution, who left no heirs because the whole family was exterminated, and they apply the proceeds of restitution for the benefit of the whole body of the refugees.

The position in regard to restitution and compensation for the victims of Nazi persecution, who are living, or were living, in the eastern sector of Berlin and in the eastern (Russian) zone, is much simpler, and for most of the claimants unsatisfactory. Immovable property can be recovered, but its value cannot be sent out of Germany to the owners abroad. And compensation for injury to health and profession and loss of liberty is awarded only to those who are still resident in the territory. One of the troublesome legal issues in Berlin has recently been settled by a decree of the Western Berlin authority. It provides that claims for confiscation of moveable property can be made by, or on behalf of, any person who had a residence or a place of business in Western Berlin though the actual confiscation by the authorities took place in the eastern sector.

The payment of restitution and compensation to individuals is altogether independent of the action of the Federal Republic in paying indemnities to the State of Israel in accordance with the agreement made between the two States in 1952. By that agreement the Republic will pay to Israel over a period of ten years goods and credits to the value of over \$700,000,000. That is a material retribution for the terrible sufferings of the Jewish people under the Nazi regime, and for the burden put upon the State of Israel in providing a home for half a million refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe. In addition, the Federal Government is paying in a similar way a substantial sum in goods for the relief of Jewish refugees who are living in distressed circumstances in other countries. That indemnity is, however,

paid not directly to the Jewish bodies concerned, but through the Government of Israel. This action of restitution—in the broader sense—to the victims of Nazi oppression is unparalleled in history by its size and comprehensiveness. Compensation was paid to the heirs of the Huguenot refugees under a law passed by the French Revolutionary Government in 1789. And after the War of Independence of the United States the British government paid compensation to the loyalists who had lost their property in America. There is not, however, any example of payment of compensation by a state to hundreds of thousands, not only of its own citizens, but of foreign subjects who suffered persecution from its rulers.

The present German legislation about compensation, indeed, is in many respects unsatisfactory and inadequate. The German government has promised that it will be amended. And it should be amended soon, because the victims of persecution are getting old and dying. There is a long way to go before the promise of full restitution and compensation will be fulfilled; but at least the work has progressed further than seemed likely at the end of the war, or five, and even seven, years later.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

THE CHARACTER OF LOUIS XV—II

FROM the moment of the death of Duchesse de Châteauroux the sole topic of the Court and the capital was the choice of a successor. They had not long to wait, and there was little surprise when Mme. de Pompadour carried off the glittering prize. In her childhood she had been taken by her mother to a fortune-teller who pronounced her *morceau du roi*. The phrase stuck in the memory of the family who called her Reinette, and when a rich marriage enabled her to entertain both in Paris and at her country home her name became familiar as one of the most accomplished hostesses of the time. Without being a beauty she possessed charm of face and manner, sang, played, danced, acted in amateur theatricals, and was a discriminating patron of the arts. That she possessed an affectionate husband and was the mother of two children proved no obstacle to the realisation of her long cherished plans. Placing herself in her phaeton in the King's path during his hunts in the neighbourhood of Etioles, her husband's country estate, she attracted his attention and was soon installed at Versailles.

Needing a friend and companion, the King had the good fortune to find the most suitable candidate in France. It would be unjust to the great lovers—Henri IV, Louis XIV, Charles II, Catherine the Great, Louis XV—to attribute their irregularities to sensuality alone. None of them had been able to choose his wife and none of them found companionship in their family circle. Of the five officially recognised Favourites of Louis XV the Pompadour was the most gifted and the most cultivated and exercised the most enduring influence. No other woman had so much to give to the King, and no one in the long line of Favourites of the Valois and the Bourbon Kings occupied such a prominent place in the history of France. Like the other members of her profession she had her enemies, and her bourgeois birth was resented by the old nobility who believed that

a royal mistress ought always to be selected from its ranks. Such considerations never troubled the King. Though she cared nothing for hunting or the card table, she shared his passion for building and landscape gardening, and the amateur theatricals in which she excelled helped to fill many an evening in the life of a ruler who had few intellectual resources of his own. She was adored by the painters who found in her a generous patron, and was admired by the *Philosophes* with Voltaire at their head. Alone of the *mattresses en titre* of the Bourbon rulers she was deeply interested in the things of the mind. She did her best for her relatives, but it would have been a miracle if she had departed from the usual type. France was at her feet. She knew nothing of the King's secret diplomacy and exerted no direct influence on French policy, but in nominations for high office, including the army, her patronage was a passport to success. The best proof of her ability to please is that she retained his friendship and confidence to the day of her death.

The only quality she lacked in the eyes of the King was temperament. Aphrodisiacs proved of no avail, and after a few years her insatiable lover turned from one of the least sensual of women to other fair charmers and to the degrading expedient of a private brothel in the Parc aux Cerfs. "There were two or three occupants at a time," testifies Valfons, "who did not know each other." Each had her own little house, a chambermaid, a cook, a laquais, and a *gouvernante* in charge. "They had a box with a grille at the Comédie which they frequented in turn and where I often saw them." The victims were procured from Paris by the chief valet Lebel. The royal visits were incognito, and some of the inmates were informed that their patron was a wealthy Polish nobleman. "The King has a little girl of fourteen," noted d'Argenson on December 10, 1752. "He likes young girls as he is afraid of syphilis." The Pompadour resigned herself to his shame, remarking to Mme. du Hausset, her lady-in-waiting: "All these uneducated little girls will never take him from me." How many illegitimate children were born we cannot be sure and their father took no interest in them. In his recent volume *Les Enfants de Louis XV—Descendance Illégitime* Henri Vignault provides a list under the headings Certain, Uncertain and Improbable. The Abbé de Bourbon appeared at Court in the following reign, and the Comte de Narbonne was destined to a distinguished career. The Parc aux Cerfs tarnished the Bourbon Monarchy as much as the Valois were disgraced by the *mignons* of Henri III.

The most critical hours of the Pompadour's life followed the attempt of Damiens on the life of the King in 1757. For the second time he believed himself to be at the gates of death. He greeted the Queen with the words: *Je suis assassiné*, when she hastened to his bedside. Though it was merely a scratch, he begged for extreme unction and a priest spent part of the first night with him in fervent prayer. "At bottom," noted d'Argenson, "the king is loved by his subjects and everyone is touched." Yet the anxiety was far less acute than when he lay in mortal danger at Metz thirteen years earlier, and fewer masses were said. It was the last occasion on which his subjects cared whether he lived or died. He lay silent and sorrowful behind the curtains of his bed. "The first time we saw him," testifies the Duc de Cheverny, a Court official, "this handsome man looked at us with such sadness as if to say: Look at your King whom a

wretch wished to assassinate and who is the most unhappy man in his kingdom." Not a word or a message passed between him and the Favourite who awaited the latest bulletin in an agony of apprehension, well aware that the accession of the pious Dauphin would mean her instant dismissal from the Court. On the eleventh day the ordeal ended with a visit from the King, who left his apartments without a word and returned smiling and resilient. Two of his Ministers were sacrificed to the vengeful spirit of the Pompadour on whose fall they had speculated. It was an unmistakeable sign to her enemies that her influence was unimpaired. When Choiseul was called to the helm in the following year the Foreign Minister and the Favourite formed a working partnership which remained intact till her death.

The five *mâîtresses en titre* meant much more to the King than his large family. He liked to regard himself as a family man, and he felt a mild affection for his daughters, though not for his wife or son; yet, with the exception of the Duchess of Parma, they played little part in his life. Though by nature a kindly person, he was too self-centred to break his heart about their feelings or their fate. The piety of the Dauphin was an unspoken rebuke to the evil life of his father, and his death may well have been a relief. Few rulers have inspired less respect, less fear and less love. He is seen at his worst in the Parc aux Cerfs, at his best in his correspondence with his youngest daughter Louise who joyfully exchanged the frivolities of the palace for the austerities of a Carmelite nunnery at St. Denis. When she begged for his permission he replied: "If it is for God alone I cannot oppose His will nor your determination. God will give you the strength to support your new condition since, the decision once made, there is no way back. I embrace you with all my heart, dear daughter, and I give you my blessing." On the first of many visits he was very depressed on arrival but cheered up when he found her fully content.

The five years following the death of the Pompadour in 1764 were the unhappiest in his life. Never had he felt so lonely, for he failed to discover a woman to fill the aching void. He craved for something more substantial than the routine of the card table, the hunt, and the joyless satisfactions of the flesh. He needed youth, vivacity, *joie de vivre*, a smiling face, and at the age of fifty-eight he found what he sought. That Mme. du Barry possessed the prettiest face in France was admitted by friend and foe; but the Court, the capital and the country deplored the infatuation of the *blasé* monarch for the illegitimate daughter of a dress-maker who had already passed from hand to hand. He had, however, reached an age when he cared as little for the background of the new Favourite as for the frowns of his *entourage*. Though she possessed little education and her manners were rather vulgar, he enjoyed her spontaneity and her childlike delight in her good fortune. When Richelieu, a connoisseur of the fair sex, inquired what he found so attractive in her the King replied that she made him forget his sixty years. The du Barry quinquennium was perhaps the happiest chapter in his life. Her official presentation forms one of the most colourful episodes in the history of the French Court. While the Pompadour, with her more sensitive feelings, had found her *début* an ordeal, this child of nature, wholly destitute of nerves, took it in her stride. Once again France possessed the expensive

luxury of an uncrowned Queen, and her ruler a congenial companion for his closing years. Except for the Royal Family and the new Dauphine Marie Antoinette, who refused to speak to her till eighteen months after her arrival, almost the whole Court was at her feet.

Good-natured, radiantly happy and completely uninterested in politics, the new Favourite had no desire except to live and let live, to be on good terms with everyone, high and low, to have plenty of money and jewels and pretty clothes, to help her friends, to enjoy every moment of life. Her chief enemy was Choiseul and still more his masculine sister the Duchesse de Gramont. When she complained of her attitude the King warned his chief Minister to be careful. "You know Mme. du Barry. *Elle est jolie, j'en suis content, cela doit suffire.* She feels no hatred for you and wishes you no harm." The hint was in vain, for Choiseul's enemies joined forces with the Favourite and secured his dismissal from the reluctant ruler.

The ablest Minister of the reign consoled himself by including in his memoirs the most savage denunciation of his master ever written. "A man without brains, loving mischief as children love to hurt animals. I do not believe that anyone ever witnessed in him a generous sentiment. If he can be said to possess a virtue, it is that of being fairly generous in money matters. His vanity is inconceivable, but he cannot give it scope for he is rightly aware of his incapacity. Though jealous of his authority, he is weakly submissive to his Ministers. Like Nero he would have been enchanted to watch Paris burning from Bellevue, though he would never have had the courage to order it." Angry men are always unjust and Choiseul's portrait is a caricature. Another fallen servant, d'Argenson, for a short period Foreign Minister, is much nearer the truth. "Our monarch is a gentle but timid bird. He dislikes working with the Ministers as the finances are so bad, and their fear of him causes his fear of them. So they shirk decisions, leaving everything to him, and he fears to make mistakes and to be deceived." A more favourable picture of "*mon bon maitre*" is painted by the Duc de Croy, who did not know him so well. The King, he declares, possessed a good heart and a good brain, but he had two major faults—timidity and sensuality. Possessing a thousand good qualities he lacked the resolution to turn them to account. A somewhat similar portrait of a well-meaning *roi fainéant* is provided by the Comte de Cheverny, Introducer of Ambassadors. "He spoke of affairs as if someone else was on the throne. This was due to his faulty education, for he was the best of men, whatever malevolent tongues may say, and I loved him passionately." The one point of agreement between friends and foes is that his incurable weakness of will unfitted him for his post. In his later years he disapproved the suppression of the Jesuits but never lifted a finger to save them. Disliking war as much as Louis XIV had loved it, though he displayed physical courage at Fontenoy, he made no effort to keep the peace. The addition of Lorraine and Corsica to the dominions of France was scanty consolation for the loss of Canada and India.

When Louis XV died of small pox in 1774 at the age of sixty-four he had long outlived his popularity. *Louis le bien-aimé* had become the target of the *chansonniers* of Paris. With the exception of Mme. du Barry there were no tears at his passing, and his coffin was greeted with derisory cries on its way to the royal vault at St. Denis. The glamour of the Monarchy was

gone and the sands were running out of the hourglass. He had ignored the solemn warning of Louis XIV, the most industrious of rulers, to his son: "Empires are preserved, as they are created, by vigour, vigilance and hard work." To the charge that he squandered a splendid heritage and let his country down there is no reply. When a ruler forfeits not merely the affection but the respect of his subjects and no constitutional remedy is available, revolution is not far away. This royal misfit might well have echoed Hamlet's despairing cry:

The times are out of joint, oh cursed spite
That I was ever born to set them right.

G. P. GOOCH.

(Concluded)

HARRISON AINSWORTH

AMONG the cherished memories of our childhood many of us remember with special affection the works of the romantic novelist Harrison Ainsworth. Yet the life of this great literary personality—celebrated in his own time—is today far too little appreciated. He was born in Manchester, one hundred and fifty years ago. Son of a prosperous solicitor, his mother was Ann Harrison, daughter of a well-known scholar, the Rev. Ralph Harrison. Manchester, with its streets of black-and-white timber houses and fine mediaeval buildings, was then a picturesque town. Even in his boyhood he possessed a vivid imagination, fostered by the much-loved familiar haunts of his birthplace. As a child he would clamber on to his father's knee to listen entranced while the older man related stories of highwaymen, being deeply interested in criminal history. The adventures of Dick Turpin haunted the young Ainsworth. Legends about Turpin abounded in the neighbourhood of Rostherne in Cheshire where he spent his holidays. Much later in his preface to *Rookwood* Ainsworth tells us "Turpin was the hero of my boyhood." Ainsworth's characteristic bent towards the macabre and the supernatural, was already developed in him as a boy. With his strongly romantic temperament Ainsworth was always an ardent Jacobite. One of his novels, *The Manchester Rebels of the Fatal '45*, was directly based on stories told him in his youth by old men whose memories reached back to the last Jacobite rising.

Ainsworth was a handsome, clever boy; rather impetuous and impulsive, brimming over with exuberant spirits which never altogether deserted him. His schooldays at Manchester Grammar School, later commemorated in his semi-autobiographical novel *Mervyn Clitheroe*, were happy. But his father had decided on a legal career for his son, though Ainsworth, like many people of artistic temperament, had no aptitude for law. When he became an articled clerk in a firm of solicitors his father remarked, "He's an idle dog—he never will work." Later no writer became more prolific and industrious than Ainsworth. We can sympathise with Ainsworth, who instead of poring over dry legal documents, found the tranquil atmosphere of the mediaeval Chetham Library in Manchester more congenial. He was greatly interested in drama and wrote his own early efforts there. He was always fortunate in his friendships, especially with James Crossley, who was exactly five years older and his most intimate friend throughout life.

Crossley, a partner in the firm of Ainsworth, Crossley and Sudlow, was a most erudite man, with a vast store of historical and classical knowledge. He encouraged Ainsworth with his literary ambitions, lent him books from his antiquarian library and considerably influenced his career.

For Ainsworth 1824—when his father suddenly died—was a vital year. He then left Manchester for London to complete his legal training and to qualify as a solicitor. For the remainder of his long life, though he often returned to Manchester as a visitor, he was never again to know it as a home. At this period he was a handsome tall youth, rather foppish, but brilliantly clever. He possessed charming manners and was popular alike with men and women. He greatly admired Charles Lamb with whom he corresponded, regarding him as his literary idol. Eventually Lamb invited him to his home at Islington but Ainsworth's expectations were rudely shattered. He wrote to Crossley: "a visit which I paid to Charles Lamb the other night has given the death-blow to my admiration of literary men. What a bona fide Cockney he is!" Lamb, however, was very kind and introduced him to his literary friends. Another friend who influenced him was John Ebers the Publisher and lessee of the Opera House in the Haymarket. Later Ainsworth married Ebers' daughter Fanny. It was owing to his advice that Ainsworth abandoned law and for a time became a book publisher. But his artistic temperament made him unsuited to a business career, though he certainly possessed a flair for discovering successful authors. Among literary aspirants he helped, was Caroline Norton, grand daughter of Richard Brinsely Sheridan. He arranged the publication of her first book of poems, *The Sorrows of Rosalie*.

Ainsworth was among the talented writers, including Thackeray, Carlyle, Southey and Coleridge, who regularly contributed to *Fraser's Magazine*. The contributors formed a literary club and dinners, memorable for the conviviality and wit of those present, were held at 215 Regent Street. His first published novel, *Sir John Chiverton* indicates clearly that he was influenced by Sir Walter Scott. But it was *Rookwood*, published in 1834, which first brought him fame. This brilliant book, with its imaginative account of Dick Turpin's ride to York along the Great North Road on his immortal mare Black Bess, illustrates Ainsworth's superb gifts as a descriptive writer. All the more remarkable because historically there is little evidence the ride to York ever took place. When we read about the pathetic death of Black Bess it is difficult to remember that the mare was the product of Ainsworth's rich creative imagination. Cuckfield Place in Sussex is the real model for Rookwood Hall, as described by Ainsworth. With its dark mysterious closets, its gloomy galleries and haunted chambers, it was a most congenial subject for him.

Fame brought him into the charmed circle of Lady Blessington's literary salon. His celebrity as an author made him a welcome guest at Seamore Place, Park Lane. An anecdote is recorded that she once placed herself on the hearth-rug between her admirer Count D'Orsay and Ainsworth, saying she had for supporters the two handsomest men in London. Here he met all the most talented young authors, including Benjamin Disraeli with whom he made friends. His early career indeed bore some resemblance to Disraeli's. They were both born in 1805 and trained for the law, but turned to literature. By a strange coincidence their first

novels—*Sir John Chiverton* and *Vivian Grey* were published almost simultaneously.

Undoubtedly the most creative and beneficial period in Ainsworth's life, was when he lived for six years (1835-41) at Kensal Lodge in the Harrow Road—then situated in delightful rural countryside. He was an affable and most hospitable host. Among his intimate friends were Charles Dickens, then a young man of twenty-three, and John Forster—the "unpunctual one," as Ainsworth refers to him in his letters, for Forster was constitutionally late. He first met Dickens in 1834 and quickly realised his genius. He advised him to publish his *Sketches of Boz* in book form and introduced him to his own publisher Macrone and illustrator George Cruikshank. As Forster records in his *Life of Dickens* it was at Kensal Lodge that he first met Dickens. Invitations there were much sought after. If only the conversation had been preserved of the brilliant literary personalities who dined with Ainsworth, how it would have enriched our appreciation of their characters!

Referring to the *Pickwick Papers*, Dickens once wrote to Forster, "The first I forwarded to you, the second I have presented to our good friend Ainsworth, and the third Kate (his wife) retained for herself." Ainsworth would often accompany Dickens on the long walks, which both enjoyed. After Dickens moved to Gadshill from London in 1856 the two authors never met again, although no record exists of any quarrels. Forster, however, who idolized Dickens, took umbrage because *Jack Sheppard* far exceeded *Oliver Twist* in popularity. He attacked it in the *Examiner*. When writing this novel the author returned to the so-called school of criminal romance in which he first made his name. It is about the notorious eighteenth-century house-breaker, Jack Sheppard. Ainsworth kept mainly to historical fact, as was his custom, but the robber after his execution in Newgate Prison was not buried at Willesden Church, as Ainsworth alleges. The book is one of the many examples of Ainsworth's skilful blending of fact with fancy. Like many of his works, it had been dramatized. The description of the Great Storm of 1723 in London with its power of suggesting terror and the fear of the supernatural, is one of the finest passages in Ainsworth. Whilst writing *Jack Sheppard* he heard of his wife's death. He had been separated for some years. Retrospectively he sadly recalled his marriage twelve years before. The following allusion in this novel showed how keenly he felt his bereavement. "Twelve years ago! It is an awful retrospect. Dare we look back upon the darkened vista, and, in imagination, retrace the path we have trod?"

The illustrations for some of the novels, including *Jack Sheppard*, *Guy Fawkes*, *Rookwood*, *The Miser's Daughter*, *Windsor Castle* and *The Tower of London*, are the work of an artist of genius, George Cruikshank. But Cruikshank was a vain and egotistical man, for he made the absurd claims that he was the real author of *The Tower of London* and *The Miser's Daughter*, claims which fortunately nobody took seriously. However, Cruikshank certainly surpassed himself in his illustrations of *The Tower of London*. Later he quarrelled with Ainsworth. Some of his best works were afterwards illustrated by other artists.

Ainsworth wrote most of *Crichton* at Kensal Lodge. His hero was James Crichton, the "admirable"—a perfect example of a *preux Chevalier*

as a courtier. In the character he is said to have portrayed his friend, Count D'Orsay. It is a masterly work with its vivid picture of the intrigues which permeated the vicious Court of Henri III. Ainsworth positively luxuriates in his detailed descriptions of the costumes and jewels of the period. Whilst visiting Paris Ainsworth had closely studied the setting for his story. As in many of his books there is the characteristic attraction to ghosts and the occult. The most sinister character is the malevolent Catherine de Medici, plotting her Machiavellian schemes, helped by her confederate the astrologer Ruggieri.

In order to write *Old Saint Paul's*—one of the most dramatic and terrible accounts of the Plague and Great Fire of London ever written—Ainsworth steeped himself in the history of the period. He particularly studied Daniel Defoe's *Journal of the Plague Year*. The book is a wonderfully vivid picture of Old London with its narrow, winding streets and high-pointed gables. As we read it we are back again in 1665 and hear once again the thunderous voice of Solomon Eagle (his real name was Eccles)—that crazy prophet of doom—denouncing the city and the wickedness of the Court. We see with horror the red crosses marked outside the houses of those smitten with the plague, irrevocably awaiting the death-cart. What strange streak of heredity in Ainsworth's nature was responsible for his ghoulish delight in the macabre and grotesque? From his father he certainly inherited his interest in criminal history and the lore of highwaymen. But his morbid interest in the supernatural, which so fascinated him, was more probably inherited from his mother's ancestors.

It was always Ainsworth's ambition to be known as *The Lancashire Novelist*. Many of his works have a Lancashire setting. Undoubtedly the best of these is *The Lancashire Witches*, with its dramatic account of the capture of Abbot Paslew, an ill-fated leader of the Pilgrimage of Grace. It contains also superb descriptions of the wild, lonely Pendle Forest Country in East Lancashire. It was Crossley, who first suggested to Ainsworth the idea of using Pott's *Wonderful Discoverie of Witches in the countie of Lancaster*—published in 1613—as the basis for a romance. It is the most important account of a Witch Trial in the seventeenth-century. Ainsworth also made use of Nicholas Assheton's Journal. All the Witches mentioned in Pott's account—such as Mother Demdike, Mother Chattox and Alice Nutter, come vividly to life again in Ainsworth's work. But he was a novelist, not an historian. Consequently he takes a certain amount of author's licence. Accordingly in *The Lancashire Witches* James I visited Lancashire in 1612 and stayed at Hoghton Tower, the residence of Sir Richard Hoghton. In reality his visit did not take place until 1617. Another example is Ainsworth's unfortunate heroine Alizon Device, who was actually a witch and executed at Lancaster Castle.

In his later life Ainsworth became somewhat of a recluse—a complete contrast to his former convivial days. For some years he lived at Hurstpierpoint, near his beloved South Downs. His novel *Ovingdean Grange* was inspired by his affection for them. He lost touch with many of his literary friends. Only with the ever faithful Crossley (who resembled Mr. Hardcastle in *She Stoops to Conquer*, "loving everything that's old, old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wine") did he keep up a voluminous correspondence regarding his books and the old Manchester

days. He died at Reigate in 1882, aged nearly seventy-seven. Of all the galaxy of writers and friends he had known, only Crossley survived to mourn the friend to whom he had dedicated long years of selfless devotion. His strength as a novelist rests in his marvellous gifts as a story-teller. He was a truly creative writer, but he needed historical fact on which to exercise his fertile imagination. Subtle analysis or delineation of character and motive are not prominent. Nevertheless, as we become engrossed in his novels, we too, like Macaulay, "are lost in amazement that his wonderful novels have not an abiding place in every house." BRYAN BEVAN.

SPAIN ON THE UP-GRADE

QUAND le bâtiment va, tout va, say the French. A tourist revisiting Spain after four years is struck not only by the building that has gone on of houses, schools and hospitals, but also by the modernisation of roads and railways, by the construction of irrigation works and of new factories side by side with the repair of old churches. Are these signs of prosperity? They at least illustrate thoughtful planning by a government animated by a determined ambition to renovate the country, to guarantee to the Spanish nation its economic independence and to give it the tools wherewith to bring this about.

The housing shortage is acute. About three million families, or one half of the population, live in cramped and unsuitable quarters. Only a half of the existing residential premises have indispensable sanitary facilities, only one-fifth have running water and drains, only one-tenth have bathrooms or showers. In the outskirts of Madrid shanty towns spoil the majesty of the capital whose population has trebled in half a century and now amounts to about 1.8 million. Spain needs no fewer than a million new housing units. To relieve the situation at least 100,000 low-priced apartments should be built every year, but the actual figure is only 25,000. The causes of this situation are obvious. First, the population this year reaches a total of 30 million, a five-million increase in twenty years, in spite of the blood-letting of 1936-39. Secondly, the old houses naturally deteriorate and three-quarters of them were built before 1900. Thirdly, widespread destruction took place during the Civil War. Lastly, Spain was the victim of an international boycott after 1945: while up to the end of 1951 Germany received from the United States a total aid of \$3,500 million and Italy \$2,630 million, Spain, as punishment for its alleged pro-German and pro-Italian sympathies, was allowed not a cent.

As a result of this peculiar method of "getting rid of Franco" Spaniards had not only to stay badly housed, but they also went hungry. Agriculture suffered from the ravages of the Civil War, from exceptional droughts and from lack of both agricultural machinery and artificial fertilizers. While in 1931-35 on an average there were 4.5 million ha. under wheat production, in 1948-50 this area fell to 3.9 million ha.; between the two periods the yearly average wheat crop decreased from 4.4 million tons to 2.7 million tons; the harvest per ha. was reduced from 970 kg. to 717 kg. The years 1951 and 1952 were good, because the harvest was almost as good as before

1935; but 1953 was again marred by a severe drought and produced only just over three million tons of wheat. Although in 1954 the crop was again 4.6 million tons, Spain imported 1.4 million tons of wheat, the largest import of the century, in order to build a reserve against the possibility of another bad harvest. Other essential crops, except rice, present a similar picture. The abundant rains of this spring foreshadow a good 1955 harvest, but, in order to insure sufficient food for all, the country should have an average yearly harvest of 5.3 million tons of wheat, three million tons of barley, six million tons of potatoes and 400,000 tons of olive oil. From the accompanying Table I it will be seen that such an aim is not too

Table I.—*AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION*

		(In thousand metric tons)					
		1931-35	1948-50	1951	1952	1953	1954
		(average)	(average)				
Wheat	4,364	2,703	4,266	4,114	3,041	4,556
Barley	2,394	1,517	2,143	1,677	1,492	2,135
Oats	670	452	552	490	434	542
Rye	551	441	514	495	406	487
Maize	709	449	585	635	707	691
Rice, paddy	293	247	285	324	393	352
Potatoes	4,954	2,795	4,000	4,550	3,426	3,717
Olive oil	353	313	600	305	348	276
Sugar, raw value	327	202	357	571	319	242

ambitious. To achieve it, however, it would be necessary to have more irrigation schemes, that is, to invest more capital. More fertilizers too, are needed: in this respect Spain has enough potash and natural phosphates, but it produces only about 85,000 tons of nitrogenous fertilizers (i.e., 38,000 tons of pure nitrogen) although it could use seven times as much. Moreover, the techniques applied in Spanish agriculture are sometimes similar to the methods of the pre-Reconquista period: grain, for instance, is still threshed by the trampling of horses, mules or cattle.

In the field of industrial production considerable progress has been achieved in comparison with 1935, which for Spain was the last normal year (see Table II). The output of coal has almost doubled and that of

Table II.—*INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION*
(In thousand metric tons; for electricity million kwh.)

	1935	1940	1946	1953	1954
Coal	6,946	8,862	10,759	12,192	12,480
Lignite	321	569	1,336	1,788	1,740
Iron ore (metal content)	1,323	1,051	750	1,524	1,704
Pig iron	349	596	508	823	924
Steel	595	804	641	896	1,097
Cement	1,463	1,275	1,835	2,772	3,324
Electricity	2,400	3,612	5,400	10,116	8,447

*See "Spain and the Defence of the West," *Contemporary Review*, December, 1952.

lignite shows an almost six-fold increase; but this does not cover all consumption, and, furthermore, Spanish coal is of poor quality. Production of metallurgical coke, which was 768,000 tons in 1929, amounted in 1953 to only 1,172,000 tons. The installed capacity of Spanish power stations has doubled in the last decade and three-quarters of them are hydro-electric plants. The output of electric power was more than quadrupled between 1935 and 1953, but in 1954 it fell from 10,116 million kwh. to 8,447 million kwh., the discrepancy being due to drought which brought the water reservoirs of power stations to a low level. However

even 10,000 million kwh. are inadequate for the steadily increasing demands of private and industrial consumption and restrictions in the use of electricity are frequent. Spain today needs a yearly minimum of 16,000 million kwh. of electric power. This is possible only by building costly reservoirs in the mountains to limit losses of water by evaporation.

Steel output almost doubled in nine years, because the plants of Bilbao and elsewhere are old; but when the new steelworks at Avilés begin operation it is estimated that the total annual output will be 2.5 million tons. Spain is rich in other minerals besides iron ore. In terms of metal content it extracted in 1953 83,700 tons of zinc and is the fourth largest producer in Europe; 54,800 tons of lead (third place in Europe); 14,900 tons of manganese (fourth place in Europe); 1.8 million tons of iron pyrites (second in the world); 1,533 tons of tungsten (seventh in the world); 1,430 tons of mercury, for which Spain is the largest world producer, covering a quarter of world consumption. Some of these ores are exported and some used in local smelting plants: in 1953 the country produced 48,800 tons of lead, 22,900 tons of zinc and 6,200 tons of copper.

The chemical industries are being developed. The production of sulphuric acid reached 760,000 tons in 1953, a three-fold increase in comparison with 1935. The output of potash (in terms of potassium oxide) was 166,000 tons (fourth largest in the world); the output of natural phosphates (in terms of tricalcium phosphate) was 14,100 (third largest in Europe). While Spain is able to export some of its potassic and phosphatic fertilizers, it is short, as already stated, of the nitrogenous ones. Nitrogen-fixing plants exist near Valladolid, Bilbao and elsewhere, and new ones are under construction. Although, of course, the basic raw material for these plants is the nitrogen in the air itself, they use a considerable amount of electric power and are costly to install.

The cotton and wool industries suffer from dollar shortage which makes difficult the buying of foreign raw materials. These industries suffer also from the modest purchasing power of the population. On the other hand, the quality of the goods and the keenness of foreign competition do not favour the export of Spanish textiles. While in 1946 the textile factories produced 85,300 tons of cotton yarn and 17,500 tons of wool yarn, in 1953 the quantities were 59,600 tons and 15,800 tons respectively. In comparison, the production of synthetic fibres increased during the same period from 8,033 tons to 11,500 tons for rayon filament yarn and from 6,731 tons to 20,600 tons for rayon staple fibre.

Except for the State Railways (*Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Espanoles*, or RENFE), no branch of industry is nationalised in Spain. But an *Instituto Nacional de Industria*, founded in 1941, stimulates private investment in a series of new industrial enterprises both by partial state financing and by guaranteeing income to private capital. The I.N.I. helped to found or convert many industrial enterprises of national importance.

Communications are another problem hampering the country's economic development. Spain has a total of 11,089 mi. of railways, including 3,053 mi. of small gauge. Only 1,114 mi. of the normal gauge have double track lines and only 431 mi. are electrified. The rolling-stock is largely old and inadequate and the poor state of the track prevents modern Diesel trains from developing their potential speed. One may go from Irun to

Madrid by a magnificent train called TALGO: designed in Spain and built in the United States, it could run at 120 mi. per hour; but, in fact, it never does more than 60. The same applies to the Italian-built bigger Diesel trains named TAF, serving the Madrid-Barcelona, Madrid-Seville and a few other main lines. But steps are being taken to modernise the rolling-stock, improve the tracks and build new lines.

Because the railway system is insufficient, roads play a constantly increasing part in public transport. It was General Primo de Rivera who gave Spain its first network of modern roads. Not every sector of the total length of 137,000 mi. is safe for motor traffic; but you can visit Spain by car in comfort because the important cities are linked by excellent roads, because the *paradores*, or state hotels, installed in ancient palaces or disused monasteries, are splendid and cheap, and because the very existence of *paradores* induced private industrialists to build many new hotels in all cities worth visiting, and these cities are so many that you need more than one holiday to acquaint yourself with Moorish, Gothic, Romanesque and Baroque Spain.

In 1952 98,300 cars and 90,600 commercial vehicles were registered in Spain. While the former are foreign, among the lorries and motor-coaches the *Pegaso*, of Spanish construction, predominates. There are about 2,400 regular motor-coach services in Spain and in 1951 they carried over 92 million passengers as compared with 112 million passengers carried by the railways.

The country's financial situation is healthy. The budget expenditure rose between 1947 and 1954 from P.14,223 million (actual) to P.26,351 million (estimated) and the revenue from P.12,964 million to P.26,114 million. It is a modest budget because the *per capita* revenue in 1954 amounted to some £8 as compared with £87 in Great Britain (£1 is equivalent to 110 pesetas). Wages and salaries are modest, too. A *peon* (bricklayer's assistant) earns in Madrid P.134 a week and the basic salary of a *catedrático* (university lecturer) is P.1,200 a month. However, because of lower prices, the purchasing power of Spanish wages and salaries is about 50 per cent higher than their sterling equivalent.

The Spanish budget has more than doubled in the last seven years and the national income has trebled between 1946 and 1953, jumping from P.93,900 million to P.279,950 million. This explains why the currency circulation increased between 1946 and 1954 from P.22,800 million to P.43,000 million, while the deposit money rose in the same period from P.26,000 million to P.59,900 million. There is no danger of inflation, because since 1951 there have been no changes in the cost of living. The "all items" index number then stood at 128 (1948=100) and it is still the same. But the index number of industrial production in December, 1954, stood at 155.

Spain is important for the defence of Europe and this was recognised by the U.S.-Spanish agreements signed in Madrid on September 26th, 1953.* In return for the U.S. military and economic aid Spain allowed the use by the U.S. forces of certain air and naval bases. Mr. John D. Lodge, the U.S. ambassador to Madrid, said on June 1st, in Barcelona, that in the two years ending on June 30th, the United States had supplied Spain with military material worth \$350 million and economic aid to the

tune of \$170 million, the latter amounting to one-seventh of Spanish imports. Speaking on the same occasion, Sr. Manuel Arburúa, minister of commerce, expressed the opinion that it was not fair to ask Spain to pay entirely for the construction of air bases and the modernisation of communications: at least part of this expenditure, he believed, should be covered by the U.S. aid.

Spain's foreign trade doubled in value in the post-war years and in 1953 amounted to \$486 million in exports and \$597 million in imports. Since, apart from the import of foodstuffs, varying with the weather conditions, capital goods and raw materials are badly needed, the balance of foreign trade shows a permanent deficit. As industrialization of the country is not only a Spanish necessity but also a Western interest, Spain should be helped on its up-hill road. If the gold reserve of the Bank of Spain amounts today to only \$54 million, one should not forget that on October 25th, 1936, 570 million dollars' worth of Spanish gold was secretly shipped from Cartagena to Odessa. Among many other conditions the West should insist on in its discussion on the "highest level" with the U.S.S.R., in an attempt to find the basis of a just and lasting co-existence, the restitution of stolen Spanish gold should be included.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI.

INDONESIA TODAY

THE recent conference of the Afro-Asian powers in Bandung afforded a striking illustration of the extent to which the political centre of gravity has moved to Asia. It also served to "project" Indonesia which was host to 26 different states with twice that number of unresolved problems. For some time now Indonesia has been a source of concern to the Western world and something of an enigma. To some minds it has come to be rightly or wrongly associated with such ominous terms as "uncertainty" and "instability." There can be little doubt that both are justified but only up to a point, and, perhaps, not nearly so much as some pessimists will have it. A few months ago, the Indonesian political scene was enlivened by yet another reshuffle of the government following bitter criticism by the Opposition—the "Masjumi," or "Moslem League," and the Socialists. Yet even with a reconstructed team Premier Sastroamidjojo cannot be said to have the ball at his feet. The present government is an uneasy coalition of no fewer than eight parties and splinter groups, which, among other things, has to prepare the country for the first General Election to be held in Indonesia since the proclamation of the Republic. Polling will take place on Sept. 29, for a House of Representatives—Indonesia's single-Chamber Parliament—of 250 members. On Dec. 15, the people of Indonesia will be called on to elect a Constituent Assembly of 500. This will frame the new Constitution, which, it is understood, will provide for a wider measure of self-rule in the various regions and territories of the vast island state. Voting in both elections will be on the principle of proportional representation and adult suffrage.

Economically, the general picture is one of progress in some fields, stagnation in others, and a need for capital expenditure and technical skills in all. Inflationary pressure is still a force to be reckoned with, but a

fair measure of success has been achieved in stabilising the prices of food and consumer goods. Despite persistent rumours about a devaluation of the Rupiah, it is safe to assume that no such move is likely to materialise in the foreseeable future. Current trade expansion is reflected in a whole series of trade agreements between Indonesia and countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain, in which the Lion's share went to the Federal German Republic and a far too modest one to the United Kingdom. Broadly speaking the financial situation, though still far from satisfactory, indicates a slight improvement over last year. The most noteworthy achievement has been the increase in the rate of rice production, which, thanks to a combination of factors, not least the operation of an extensive network of Rice Banks, has at last caught up with and exceeded the rapid increase in population. The chronic rice shortage of the past has ceased to be a problem to Indonesia's teeming millions.

Within this general picture there are other features less pleasing to the eye. Whereas Indonesia's partners in the Colombo Plan have much to show in the matter of industrial progress, the development of her home industries is still lagging behind schedule. Rubber, her staple export, is severely handicapped, not only by falling prices on world markets, but by its inferior quality which makes it non-competitive abroad. For reasons of political expediency several measures have come into force with a distinctly "autarchic" flavour. A case in point was the ordinance whereby foreign companies holding sole trading agencies in Indonesia are to transfer their ownership, or at least their management, to Indonesian nationals. This may seem of doubtful wisdom in a country where there is still an acute shortage of people with managerial skills, where the need for foreign investments is as great as ever and the major part of the importing business is still handled by Dutch and British firms. It is as yet too early to draw any conclusions from this latest excursion into economic Nationalism. What its practical results will be in the long run is, of course, another matter.

The general Election to be held in the Autumn will mark the last stage but one in the constitutional development of Indonesia. Though it is not expected that the outcome of it will affect foreign policy to any appreciable degree, it may, perhaps, set a new course in home politics. There is no lack of domestic problems, not the least invidious being the maintenance of law and order. The size of the thousands of islands and the tremendous distances between them present complexities which even the most efficient administration would find difficult to solve. While it cannot be denied that much has been done to promote decentralisation, wide areas in North Sumatra, South Celebes and West Java are in a state of perennial turmoil. In some, such as South Celebes, the issue is one of regional interests versus the central authority; in others, such as North Sumatra and West Java, it is the clash between Muslim traditionalism and secular emancipation. But in all the troubled areas the underlying motive is a longing for a higher standard of living and local autonomy. Of the various "Home Rule" and other movements which are still a challenge to orderly government none has been more militant than the Dar-ul-Islam, the Indonesian equivalent of the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt. For years now, the Dar-ul-Islam has imposed its own rule over wide areas in West and Central

Java; a "parallel government" that is in fact a compound of ancient Islamic law and political terrorism. The lack of legal experts has so far held up the introduction of a uniform legal system throughout the archipelago—an "omission" that is duly appreciated by the extremists of the political Left and the religious Right.

Whatever else may colour Indonesian politics, Nationalism remains the prevalent influence, especially in foreign affairs. Neither the advent of SEATO nor Communist successes in Indonesia and abroad have induced her government to modify the policy of "no alignment with East or West." This may be explained, partly by lingering suspicions of "colonialism," partly by fear of another war, partly by a genuine belief that the Colombo Plan and not the Manila Pact is the way to win over the peoples of Asia. Nationalism is also the crux of the long-standing dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the western half of New Guinea. This concerns a territory under Dutch trusteeship which was not included in the settlement reached at the Round Table Conference in 1949 that preceded the transfer of sovereignty from Dutch to Indonesian control. Western New Guinea, one of the most backward territories in the S.W. Pacific, has an area of some 160,000 square miles and a population of about 700,000 Papuans, whose primitive standard of living has earned them the irreverent epithet of "Stone Age People." The Indonesians claim Western New Guinea as an integral part of their homeland and regard the Dutch administration as a colonial anachronism. The Dutch attitude is rather like that of the guardian of an infant who will not give up his trust until the child can stand on its own feet. In recent years substantial progress has been achieved there in the social and industrial field and given a sound administration much more can be done to make of this primitive land a modern "going concern." So far protracted negotiations and Dutch offers to meet the Indonesians half-way have failed in their purpose. Nor is this all. A third interested party in the dispute is Australia, which administers the eastern half of the island of New Guinea and regards the whole of it as the outer bastion of her own defences. When the question of Western New Guinea came up in the UN Political Committee in November last year, Indonesia failed to carry her point, while both the British and Australian delegates strongly supported the *status quo*. There the matters rest; Indonesia snubbed and resentful, the Dutch and Australians firmly opposed to any transfer of control. As for the Stone Age Papuans their verdict is not recorded.

DAVID INGBER.

MEDIEVAL TALES

TO-DAY, the most famous collection of short stories known in this country for 500 years, lie forgotten and neglected. You would be lucky if you found a dusty copy on the back shelves of some public library, though up to the nineteenth century, the *Gesta Romanorum* was so renowned that if you had not read at least some of these 181 short stories, you would have been considered illiterate. This almost forgotten book, known to the early Plantagenets, and to countless people of all classes down the centuries, exerted a profound influence upon English literature, and today we can still trace its reaction upon the modern short

story. Shakespeare himself owes a great debt to the *Gesta Romanorum*, for he drew widely on them. The "bond story" in his "Merchant of Venice" is but one example. "Macbeth" and "Lear" also borrowed from the famous book. Who wrote these short stories, who collected them and why are they forgotten, though their influence lives on? The stories, 181 of them in all, were invented by monks as a fire-side recreation and re-told from the pulpit as moral discourses. The stories vary in length, content and application, but they cover the whole scale of human emotional and moral development, from love, mercy, justice, pride to gluttony, drunkenness, fidelity and adultery. Some of them appear to modern minds as crude and even rude, yet others are still as fresh and fragrant as a rose in the morning dew. There is some doubt as to who collected the stories into one volume and gave them a title. Some scholars say it was Pierre Bercheur, a French prior of the Benedictine Convent of Saint Eloi, in Paris, for the stories were current in Europe as well as in Britain. Others say it was John Bromyard, the theologian, who in 1380 got together many stories, and because most of them were based on the work of minor classical writers, called them "Works of Roman Authors." The stories were, of course, transcribed in Latin. Probably the truth is that both these men made their own collections, unknown to each other. What is proved is that the book in its present form was compiled at the end of the 14th century, was later translated into Anglo-Latin, turned into English sometime in the 16th century, and in 1824 was edited and modernised by the Rev. Charles Swan. It is Swan's edition that we shall probably find in our public library.

For five hundred years the *Gesta Romanorum* (Works of Roman Authors) were popular entertainment as well as philosophical discourse, and their decline in the 19th century was probably due to the cluster of inventions, discoveries and social reforms that took place in this century—the Iron Age which closed the gates on the "Golden Past" as the poets called it.

Probably in Queen Elizabeth's reign (now Queen Elizabeth I), the *Gesta Romanorum* reached the zenith of its popularity. In a comedy, *Sir Giles Goosecap*, published at the time occurs the following passage: "Then for your lordship's quips and quick jests why *Gesta Romanorum* were nothing on them." In another play, *May-Day*, written by Chapman which appeared in 1611, one of the characters says: "One that has read Marcus Aurelius, *Gesta Romanorum*, the Mirrour of Magistrates etc . . . to be led by the nose like a blind bear that has read nothing!" An interesting feature of this ancient collection of short stories is that several of the tales are borrowed from Greek and Roman classical authors and retold with a certain amount of corruption plus a Christian moral. Probably the best example is tale No. 11. This is founded on the 28th chapter of Aristotle's "Secretum Secretorum," in which the Queen of India is said to have spited herself on the great Alexander by sending him among other costly presents, the pretended testimonies of her friendship, a maiden of exquisite beauty, who had been fed with serpents from infancy. The maiden was so ravishingly beautiful that those who looked upon her almost went mad. The moment Alexander saw her he became violently enamoured and desired to possess her. Aristotle, his teacher, observing his weakness, begged the prince not to consort with the girl. To prove

how evil she was Aristotle commanded a malefactor under sentence of death to be put with the girl. Scarcely had the condemned man touched the girl's lips than he expired in great agony. Alexander, joyful at his narrow escape from such treachery, packed the girl back to her mother. The moral to this story is added in the following words: The Queen is a superfluity of the things of life, which sometimes destroy the spirit and generally the body. The poisoned beauty is Luxury and Gluttony which feed men with delicacies that are poison to the soul. Aristotle is your conscience, or reason, the malefactor is a perverse man, disobedient to God and more diligent in pursuing his own carnal delights than the divine commands. Let us then study to live honestly and uprightly, in order that we may attain to everlasting life.

Taking into consideration all the circumstances, especially the popularity of these 181 stories during a period which is known as the "Dark Middle Ages," one is impressed by the fact that they are particularly free from vulgarity and coarse humour. Even when such delicate subjects as adultery are mentioned, the plot is transferred to the animal kingdom to avoid gentle susceptibilities, yet to punch home the moral. Let us, for our own entertainment and edification look at No. 181 of the collection—the last one. A certain king had a lion, a lioness and a leopard, whom he much delighted in. During the lion's absence the lioness consorted with the leopard. In order that she might prevent the lion discovering her infidelity she used to wash herself in a fountain adjoining the king's castle. Now the king, having often perceived what was going forward, commanded the fountain to be closed. This done, the lioness was unable to cleanse herself; and the lion returning and ascertaining the injury that had been done to him, assumed the place of a judge, sentenced her to death, and immediately executed the sentence. But not every story was supercharged with a moral. Tale No. 136 gives us a sample of unsophisticated humour. A thief went one night to the house of a rich man, and scaling the roof, peeped through a hole to examine if any part of the family were yet stirring. The master of the house suspecting something, said secretly to his wife: "Ask me in a loud voice how I acquired the property I possess, and do not desist until I bid you." The wife complied and began to vociferate. "My dear husband, pray tell me, since you never were a merchant, how you obtained all the wealth which you have now collected." "My love," answered her husband, "do not ask such foolish questions." But she persisted in her enquiries, and at length, as if overcome by her urgency, he said: "Keep what I am going to tell you a secret, and your curiosity shall be gratified." "You can trust me," she said. "Well, then, you must know that I was a thief, and obtained what I now enjoy by nightly depredations." "It is strange," said the wife, "that you were never taken." "Why," replied he, "my master, who was a skilful clerk, taught me a particular word, which, when I ascended the tops of people's houses, I pronounced, and thus escaped detection." "Tell me," the lady pleaded, "what that powerful word was." "Hear then; but never mention it again, or we shall lose all our property." "Be sure of that," said his wife, "I will never repeat it." "It was—is there no one within hearing?—the mighty word FALSE!" The wife, apparently satisfied, fell asleep, and her husband feigned it. He snored

lustily, and the thief above, who had heard their conversation with much pleasure, aided by the light of the moon, descended, repeating seven times the word he had just heard. But being too much occupied with the magic word to mind his footing, he stepped through the window into the house; and in falling he dislocated his leg and arm and lay half dead on the floor. The owner of the house, hearing the noise, and well knowing the reason, though he pretended ignorance, asked, "What was the matter?" "Oh!" groaned the suffering thief, "FALSE words have deceived me."

One of the best known stories is the one about the mighty Roman Emperor Menelay who ordained that if an innocent person was taken and put in prison, if he might escape and come to the Emperor's palace, he should be there safe from all manner of accusations against him in his life time. It was not long after when it happened that a knight was accused and put in a strong and dark prison, where he lay and had no light but a little window that lighted him to eat such simple meat as the keeper brought him. Wherefore he mourned greatly and made sorrow that he was thus fast shut up from the sight of men. Nevertheless, when the keeper was gone, there came daily a nightingale in at the window, and sung full sweetly. By the song the knight was fed with joy; when the bird left off singing, then it would fly on to the knight's bosom. There the knight fed her many a day of the victual that God sent him. It befel after upon a day that the knight was very sad. Nevertheless, the bird sat on his breast and fed upon kernels of nuts. And he said to the bird, "Sweet bird, I have sustained you many a day, what will you give me now in my desolation of comfort? Remember, you and I are creatures of God." When the bird heard this she flew forth from his bosom, and tarried from him for three days, but the third day she came again, and brought in her mouth a precious stone, and laid it on the knight's bosom. Then she flew away from him. The knight marvelled at the stone, and took it into his hand. He touched his fetters with it and they fell off. Then he arose, touched the doors of his prison, and they opened. He made his escape and ran fast to the Emperor's palace. When the keeper of the prison perceived this, he blew his horn thrice, and raised up all the folk in the city, and led them forth crying with a high voice, lo, the thief is gone, we must pursue him. With that he ran before all his fellows towards the knight; and when he came near him, the knight bent his bow, and shot an arrow, wherewith he smote the keeper in the lungs and slew him. Then he ran to the palace, where he found succour against the law.

Maybe the plot seems simple and unsophisticated to us over-civilised humans of the 20th century, but on the minds of the illiterate listeners of the 14th and 15th centuries it made an indelible impression. For being confined to prison in those dark days meant being shut up in a dungeon, bereft of light, chained to the wall with only vermin—not birds—as companions. Besides, the roving monks who told stories like this by the log fire of the wayside inn or from the pulpit of the village church, knew that to promote Christianity they must not rely on abstract argument and logical deduction but on the stirring of the emotions of their listeners. The *Gesta Romanorum* collection of short stories deserves a better fate than to lie unnoticed and forgotten in the dust of neglect and indifference.

MAX GORDON.

ALBANIA UNDER COMMUNISM

IN April, 1954 seven Albanians were sentenced to death in Tirana by a military tribunal which found that they had been trained and equipped as "agents of Anglo-American imperialism" and dropped into Albania by the Americans. In the autumn Radio Tirana alleged that more had been caught. In November Mr. Dulles declared that "the present suffering of the Albanian people under Soviet Communist oppression and their strong desire to be rid of this alien yoke are matters of deep concern to the United States." These brief news items recall that this peasant country of a million inhabitants, more impervious to Western visitors than Russia, is an outpost of the Soviet bloc, though her potential strategic importance is neutralised by isolation and Russia's interest in her therefore can hardly be more than a matter of prestige.

In 1912 the Albanians threw off the pall of Turkish suzerainty which had smothered them for almost five centuries. But they were hardly free when their medieval country was overrun by contending armies during the First World War, and the troubled interregnum which ensued came to an end only when an able young chieftain, Ahmet Zogu, seized power in 1925 becoming King Zog in 1928. But Albania's frontiers, drawn by international commissions, had left a third of the Albanian race under Yugoslav rule in Kossova and appreciable elements in Greece, while including Albanian adherents of the "Greek" Church whom Greece claims upon fallacious religious grounds. These circumstances prejudiced Albania's relations with her landward neighbours and predisposed her to accept the sorely needed financial and advisory aid which Italy proffered in furtherance of her strategic and expansionist ends.

In Albania under Turkish rule independence and purity of stock had survived in the primitive isolation of the northern highlands and remote hill villages; but in the accessible coastal plain and wider valleys of the south, where, by subtlety or skilful service to the suzerain, favoured Albanian Moslems had acquired large estates, servitude had become the lot and habit among the very poor and landless. And inevitably Zog's administration was founded upon the dominant class whose administrative experience was seldom dissociated from wealth, privilege and corruption; so, with the inevitable spread of Western standards and liberal ideas, impatience and resentment smouldered ominously and the rising generation turned for guidance to those rare liberal savants among whom Midhat Frasheri was pre-eminent. But though Zog did not press reforms fast or fearlessly enough for the progressives, he went too far for the liking of landowning beys and chieftains who were jealous of his position anyway; and when, therefore, he declined to prostitute Albanian independence to serve Italian military purposes, these men readily provided a spurious pretext for the Italian invasion in April, 1939, by "inviting" Mussolini to annex Albania to the Italian crown. The Italian-trained Albanian army, sabotaged and ill-equipped, offered little resistance. King Zog fled, not widely lamented. The people were stupefied.

The Italians established a "quisling" government, interned leading patriots, tightened their grip on the army, brought employment to the poor, enhanced authority to complaisant landowners, "subsidies" to chieftains,

and when Italy entered the World War they proclaimed the union of Kossova with Albania. But to patriots no advantages were recompense for loss of independence, and bands began to form in the mountains, armed and strengthened by opportunities and desertions which followed Italian reverses at the hands of the Greeks. By the end of 1942 two main Resistance Groups existed—the National Front (Ballists) of peasants and liberal republicans, led by Frasheri and active mainly in central Albania; and the Communist-directed National Liberation Movement led by Enver Hodja, a Korcha schoolmaster, operating chiefly in the south-east. A peasant country with negligible industries and no large towns, Albania was unfavourable soil for Communism, and though a small cell had existed for some years in Korcha, a Communist party was formed only in November, 1941, promoted by Yugoslavs and encouraged by Russia's entry into the war. Proclaiming themselves a patriotic anti-Fascist liberation movement, this hard core of determined men soon gained numerous adherents, particularly among the workers and landless peasants of the south who had little to lose from reprisals and much to gain from rebellion; and they said so little of their Communism that they were joined even by Monarchists. When, in April, 1943, a British mission with the Greek Resistance contacted them they were a considerable force, and soon plentiful British arms and supplies were being dropped to them and British officers were instructing them.

Immediately Italy collapsed the Communists set out to impose social revolution by force and attacked the Ballists, whereupon the Monarchists broke with them and formed a separate "Legitimist" movement. When German forces replaced the disintegrating Italians, the British strove to ally the nationalist Ballists and Legitimists with the Communists against them; but the Communists would have no such co-operation and attacked their two now allied political rivals whenever the latter, loyal to the British, prepared to attack the occupying forces. The Germans gave wide authority to a government of patriots whom the Italians had interned, confirmed the union of Kossova with Albania, and encouraged resistance to Communism. The Communists, for favour of British supplies, intermittently attacked the Germans; but the British (who would guarantee nothing, not even Albania's pre-war frontiers) were unable to restrain Communist onslaughts upon their weaker rivals, and ultimately abandoned these two nationalist Resistance Groups to their fate—a pathetic and humiliating tale. Soon afterwards the Germans withdrew, and in November, 1944, the Communists found themselves masters of Albania.

While there had been a foreign enemy to fight and a reactionary social order to displace, while the presence of British officers and supplies were evidence of Western support, Enver Hodja and his Communist colleagues had little difficulty in controlling forces which included many moderate and patriotic men. But once the war ended their survival depended upon the liquidation of nationalist opponents, extirpation of "deviationists," and the creation of a firm foundation for a cohesive party strong enough to hold down the fiercely individualistic peasants until indoctrination through the years had done its work. The expansion of the "working class" by development of industry, the formation of a new peasantry by re-distribution of the land, and the provision of channels for indoctrination by

expanding educational facilities, were obvious courses in a potentially rich but backward land. But in this little country where the "bush telegraph" is highly developed, it was unsafe to allow missions or representatives of the democratic Powers to remain, inevitably protesting at outrages and fallacies: particularly did this apply to the British and Americans whose practical sympathy with the people had been shown over many years. So friction was generated, leading to withdrawal of the missions and severance of relations. Rigid adherence to the Soviet line in 1948 during the Russian rupture with "the Trotskyist and anti-Marxist Tito," hitherto the Albanian Communists' mainstay, was justified by the assertion that Russia alone protects Albania from her rapacious neighbours and brought dividends in substantial Russian aid, both material and advisory. Formal relations with Yugoslavia were re-established in March, 1954, but the visit of a Russian naval squadron to Albania in June—no doubt intended as an encouragement in face of the Balkan alliance—was quickly followed by the "resignation" of dictator Enver Hodja, who made way for his Minister of Interior, Mehmet Shehu. A trade agreement concluded with Italy in December (following agreements with Bulgaria and China) may indicate that under the more rigid orthodoxy of Shehu restricted contact with the West may be allowed.

A decade has now gone by since Communism gripped Albania and anticipated a liberal-social revolution. Unquestionably, in that decade, much material progress has been made which must be measured, not by the yardstick of the West, but by comparison with the country's backward condition in 1939. That better progress might have been made by a democratic regime without the unacceptable features of Communism is another matter. Measures that have inflicted injustice and destitution upon some have brought material betterment to others; for example, there seems no reason to doubt the Albanian official statement that nearly 20,000 owners of land have been partially or totally expropriated and their property re-distributed among 70,000 landless families. While, therefore, one need not doubt that there is hostility to the regime among the expropriated and among the liberal-minded who resent any dictatorship, it is unrealistic to disbelieve that among the very poor and underprivileged who never knew the freedom of democracy, and among the new generation of indoctrinated youth, there is strong backing for the regime. Clearly, initiatives designed to dissipate Communism, should offer liberal alternatives holding no hint that the clock will be put back or the reactionaries reinstated, or the under-privileged deprived of fair gains. But a contrary policy has been imposed of late. In 1949, with Anglo-American backing, a National Committee for Free Albania was established in Rome, founded by Midhat Frasheri, who had escaped from Albania in 1944 with other nationalist resistance leaders. But Frasheri died, and intrigues ensued—the work some believe, of Italians who hope to recover control of Albania. Nor were the new "Backers' Representatives" (American and British Liaison Officers) happily chosen; in November, 1953, under American direction, they abruptly dissolved the Committee, hand-picked another from among financial or political dependents, and included in it men whose names are ineradicably associated with the betrayal of Albania to Italy in 1939 or with the reactionary social order of that time. The

Communists are elated, holding that this espousal of reaction proves the intentions of the "Anglo-American imperialists." The liberal-agrarian Ballists, on this account, will have nothing to do with this new and unrepresentative Committee and the Legitimists are incensed by such dictation. Possibly it is because the Albanian problem is relatively too small to receive close attention at a high level that ideological realities are disregarded. But the Albanians deserve better. Hope seems to lie now, not in revolution and "liberation", but in evolution and liberalisation. A policy aimed at encouraging a brand of "Titoism," supported by some clear reassurance of Albanian territorial integrity within existing frontiers to remove apprehensions, and by provision of educational opportunities to create a nucleus of future democratic leaders, would seem a more practical course than sterile "cloak and dagger" opportunism. The international scene now encourages hope that constructive thought—on both sides—may soon prevail.

J. SWIRE.

POLES IN EXILE

THE tragic Yalta compromise had a double effect upon the fate of Poland. It not only effaced her from the map of Europe as a free and independent State, but also deprived of a homeland nearly two million Poles who for political and military reasons, when the war ended, remained abroad. At that period there were about 250,000 Poles under arms. After the end of hostilities a small portion of them returned to Poland but the bulk, now nearly 136,000, decided to remain in Great Britain. In addition to these, there are still great masses of Polish emigrants mostly in France, Germany, United States, Canada and Australia. Britain was and still is the most important centre of Polish emigration. In the 19th century, when Poland was divided between three powerful neighbours, France was the main base of Polish efforts towards the regaining of independence. Now this role is played by Great Britain and the links between Poles and the Anglo-Saxon peoples have become closer.

There were two main waves of Polish emigration to Britain. The first started after the collapse of France, the second at the end of the war, when the armed forces were demobilized and some 160,000 Poles who did not wish to return home were absorbed into British life through the agency of the Polish Resettlement Corps launched by the British Government of that period.

The Polish community which originated here when the Government in exile moved to London is by far the most highly organised of all the refugee groups, making up almost a complete country in miniature, with President, Government, Council of the Polish Republic, Polish National Fund and dozens of self-governing institutions, associations, clubs, etc. It is throbbing with activity, political, literary, economic and social, with London as the unofficial capital of the exiles. The President August Zaleski derives his authority from the Constitution of 1935 and is the main-stay of the legal existence of the Polish State in exile. He cannot be removed unless he resigns or dies. Prince Eustace Sapieha, former Foreign Minister, will succeed him in an emergency. This is in effect the

step the late President, Mr. Raczkiewicz, took before his death in 1947, when he appointed Mr. Zaleski as his successor. Mr. Zaleski was twice Foreign Minister, Senator and bank president before 1939. Almost a third of the Poles, 35,000, live in Greater London, and a large proportion of these have chosen Kensington and Chelsea as their home. Here they have their clubs, cafés, restaurants, all staffed by Poles of both sexes. In their shops and restaurants they serve Polish food and sell Polish delicacies. In this neighbourhood there are many Polish-owned hostels, boarding-houses and guest-rooms, not to mention hairdressing and tailoring establishments, snack bars, repair shops of various kinds and so on. The little Polish church in Devonia Road in the Eastend, which was used when the Polish colony was very small and consisted mainly of workers, has now been exchanged for the sumptuous Brompton Oratory. Thanks to the special arrangements of their English Roman Catholic friends, Poles can hold their own services conducted by Polish priests with Polish sermons. After each Polish Sunday Service, they in their thousands overflow on to the pavements outside the church to chat for a while, creating for a moment the illusion of a home. Men outnumber women by a large margin, and create the impression of a male emigration. For those who live and work in scattered parts of London this Sunday rendez-vous is their only opportunity to see friends and exchange news.

Other "Polish cities" in England are Manchester, Birmingham, Bradford, Wolverhampton; in Scotland, Edinburgh and Glasgow. There are also scattered groups up and down the country, though recently the trend has been away from the country to the towns, not only because of better prospects of working in a factory, but because the Poles are clannish and stick together wherever they can. All large towns have their Polish clubs where Polish food is served, without which no Pole would feel really happy. They are throbbing with active social, political and literary life and even with theatrical enterprises.

The problem of resettling and employing so many Poles required a considerable effort on the part of the British Government as well as the Poles themselves. Language difficulties, strange customs, even the unpredictable climate, all had their influence upon its solution. The question of finding homes in an already overcrowded island was by no means easy. Forced to live in a foreign country, they realized that they and their children had to learn the language, manners and habits of this island race before they could hope to carve out for themselves a tolerable existence. The problem of "homes for Poles" was first tackled by the British Ministry of Labour under the authority of the Polish Resettlement Act. Dozens of hostels sprung up all over the country where Polish ex-servicemen, and their dependents live in a complete Polish atmosphere. In 1948, 16,000 Poles were being fed and accommodated in 40 hostels, but today the figure has dropped to about 10,000 in 20 hostels, of whom many thousands are on a landlord and tenant basis, paying rent. Only a few hundred are still living on charity, and they are mostly the old and infirm who have no younger members of the family to look after them. Those over 50 find it increasingly difficult to get suitable work. Although among them there are many highly educated and brilliant men and women, the British community seems to have no use for these highly trained

FEDERAL SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH 115

scholars, writers, novelists and playwrights, and they have to rely on public grants for a miserable existence.

The problem of education, from infancy to college, was tackled by the Ministry of Education in March, 1947, when the "Committee for the Education of Poles in Great Britain" came into being under the Polish Resettlement Act. The Committee's objective was "to secure that those Poles who do not elect to return to their country are fitted for settlement in this country and overseas." The Committee made use of British educational institutions, and had established and maintained separate schools for Poles only when language or other difficulties made it necessary. As soon as children learned sufficiently the English language, they were transferred to higher English educational institutions. In this way over 7,000 students were taught in English high schools and colleges during the past few years, and nearly 4,000 children attended 55 Polish schools. It is worth the expense, as these young Poles are now being gradually integrated into British social and economic life. Wherever necessary, the British authorities made reasonable provisions for the study of the Polish language, history and culture, and no visible pressure was exercised to anglicise them. This is a very ticklish point with the Poles because they are staunch patriots, strongly devoted to the language, culture and religion of their native country. To provide for their intellectual needs and the educated Poles outnumber the uneducated—a large number of Polish publications have come into existence such as dailies, weeklies, monthlies, magazines, theatres, art exhibitions, lecture halls and public meetings.

As regards the standard of living, on the whole the Poles enjoy a level of comfort not lower than they knew at home. This refers in particular to the middle and working class. Though many are still living in hostels and even in the Nissen huts, their earnings are considerably larger than at home in pre-war days. Those who are having a hard time are the educated Poles, especially the lawyers, economists, journalists, scientists, research workers in history, science or art, and army officers. Most of them had to settle down to jobs which bear no relation to the life for which they were trained. There are hundreds of examples of Poles with a brilliant educational or professional record who are working as porters, night-watchmen, waiters, liftmen or even as unskilled labourers. Their lot is indeed a tragic one and nobody seems to be interested in their fate. The only prosperous Poles are those who own cafés, food or drug stores, hotels and trading establishments. Among those best situated are the doctors, dentists and import and export merchants.

S. KLECZKOWSKI.

FEDERAL SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH

ON October 1st the revised Nigerian constitution came into force; by it federation is confirmed as the only practicable form of government for this future dominion. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has been an accomplished fact for a year. Now, somewhat surprisingly, there are reports of a similar intention on a minor scale for the recently belligerent peoples of the Aden Protectorate; while, ever since

1947, the British West Indian Islands have been making unspectacular progress towards the establishment of a Caribbean Federation. In fact, over the last hundred years, the adoption of a federal system has become, in the British Commonwealth and Empire, almost the conventional solution to the problems of government in widely divergent political and economic circumstances. It is, of course, an essential prerequisite for the successful practice of federal government that the national or regional groups involved should be fully prepared to surrender their exclusive authority over some matters and assert it positively over others. Federation, in other words, involves a nice balance between the need for unity and a desire for separation. Canada and Australia in setting the example, though in somewhat different ways, precipitated an abortive plan for Imperial Federation. This failed because it would have reversed the process of decentralisation which was essential for the establishment of good relations between peoples so distant that their common interests were bound to be general rather than particular.

Federal government consists in a division of executive and legislative power between a central and a number of regional governments. The proportions in which this power is divided are naturally of great importance but need not be regarded as directly relevant to a definition of federation. In Canada, for instance, the responsibility for all matters not definitely allocated to the provincial governments remains with the central authority, while in Australia the reverse is true and residuary powers lie with the states. Recent events have, however, focussed attention not so much on these constitutional subtleties as on the wide variety of circumstances which may make a federal rather than a unitary organization desirable. Factors normally tending towards unity in a state are common race, religion and language. Correspondingly, diversity of these three elements may well produce a desire for separation, and where a large overall state exists already federation is likely to be the best means of preventing total disintegration. Where, on the other hand, common strategic and economic interests suggest the value of close co-operation between smaller colonies or states, federation may be the means of putting it into effect. But in whichever direction the process is taking place the need for defence against an external military threat or to create or maintain a large state for the sake of economic viability generally plays a decisive part.

It was appropriate in many ways that the first British territory to assume federal status should be Canada—a change which was provided for in the British North America Act of 1867. The United States Constitution, of course, suggested the idea but not the pattern for the Canadian plan, though it is interesting that this should have been accepted at precisely the moment when the original federation was experiencing its greatest crisis as a result of the attempted secession of its Southern States. On the other hand, it was the presence of a powerful neighbour on their frontier which, in fact, convinced Canadians of the necessity for such a scheme. The military threat to Canada as expressed by the Fenian raids of 1866 served to confirm popular support for federation, while economic needs in the face of competition from across the frontier were a constant reminder of the desirability of unity and strength. Work recently begun on the new St. Lawrence seaway to be completed by 1960 will finally

solve the problem of communication between the industrial area around the Great Lakes and the export markets of the outside world. In 1860, because of the scale of such a project, there was no alternative but an inter-colonial railway linking the colony of Canada proper with the port of Halifax in Nova Scotia. This scheme, however, involved two things: capital beyond the resources of the Colony and a working agreement with the separate Maritime territories. Similarly a railway westwards would open up the prairies to wheat growing and secure the co-operation of British Columbia—a colony barely established. The revocation by the United States Congress of the Canadian-American Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 was a reminder of the stark economic facts. With a judicious mixture of arguments based on all these factors the reluctant Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island were persuaded to join the existing Union. At the same time federation gave the French Canadians the opportunity to secure their comparative independence of which the Union Act of 1840 had been intended to deprive them. As recently as 1949, Newfoundland, once a Dominion, joined Canada in belated recognition of the validity of the arguments used nearly a century ago.

The need to attract capital for development projects remains, as the Central African argument showed, a principal reason for federation. Investors are bound to assess the economic prospects of a state to some extent in accordance with the size of population and, therefore, of the internal market. Though informed Australian opinion at the end of the nineteenth century realised that much more rapid expansion of, for instance, road, railway and shipping services would result from the encouragement of investment, alarmist declarations on defence proved to have the greater popular effect there. The threat of French and German intrusion in the South Pacific and eventually the similar danger which might follow uncontrolled Asian immigration proved powerful arguments. So too did the evident success of the American system of government recently brought home by the publication of Lord Bryce's book *The American Commonwealth*. Though Australia had no racial minority to foster the federal idea, important differences of climate and economic interest prevented any serious consideration of political union. In particular Victoria's commerce needed some protection against the rapidly developing industry which made New South Wales urge free trade. It may be said that in Australia, while the advantages of union were clear enough, the reasons for maintaining local independence seem in retrospect too slight to justify the additional cost in money and manpower of federal government. The "failure of Australian federalism" has been widely discussed in recent years.

In South Africa, on the other hand, the reverse could well be argued to be true. If federation had been adopted in 1909, would Natal politicians, whose predecessors advocated it, now be talking of secession? Differences of language, of attitude towards the African, even to some extent of religion were all present as factors tending to separation. The entrenched clauses of the South Africa Act of 1909, regarded by the Nationalist Governments since 1948 as an affront to national sovereignty, are evidence of the divisions at the time. The quasi-federal decentralization of government in the Union has proved no substitute for federation itself. Union was

strongly advocated, especially by General Smuts and Lord de Villiers, on the grounds that it would encourage national unity between Briton and Afrikaaner. The experiment has failed to the extent that the present Prime Minister has said, with curious logic, that now only a Republic outside the Commonwealth could encourage a patriotic feeling for South African nationality.

As the twentieth century has progressed the unity of the Commonwealth in war has been regularly demonstrated. This fact, and the geographical position of the territories concerned, has reduced the defence argument to comparative insignificance in discussions on federation between existing separate territories. In Malaya with its established system of state rule the creation of the federation was largely a matter of convenience about which there could be little disagreement. The debates on the possibility of some sort of federal connection in East and Central Africa began thirty years ago as Mr. L. S. Amery in Vol. II of *My Political Life* and Sir Philip Mitchell in *African Afterthoughts* have recently reminded us. The possibility of official sponsorship for the scheme known as "Capricornia" has hung like a shadow over Uganda in its recent crisis.

In relatively undeveloped territories, as in Africa, the economic argument for federation carries great weight. How else is British and American capital from private sources to be attracted in sufficient quantities or a vast hydro-electric scheme prove economically worthwhile? Such considerations dominated the negotiations which led to the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland at the end of 1954. The case was clear for formal co-operation between the separately unbalanced economies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia: in the simplest terms, coal from the Wankie Colliery was essential to the Copper Belt and power from the waters of the Zambesi to both. In retrospect the insistence on Nyasaland entering the association at this stage seems to have been based on less substantial arguments: nevertheless, the different nature of the relationship between the three territories and the British Government and, in particular, the responsibility of the Colonial Office for the welfare of the Nyasaland African made amalgamation unacceptable. In the Canadian federation the legal power to amend the constitution until recently remained with the British parliament: in Central Africa the role of Britain through the Colonial Office and the African Affairs Board could be more than formal and a potent source of friction.

Under the revised version of the Nigerian Constitution, which first became federal in 1952, the Regions have a similar right of correspondence with London, though, not, of course, for the same reasons. Nigeria as a political entity is entirely the product of British rule. Beginning with the kingdom of Lagos in 1861, the territory came under British protection progressively until in 1914 Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated for the sake of administrative convenience, which is generally a valid reason for union. Subsequently the trust territory of the Cameroons, formerly German, lying along the Eastern boundary of Nigeria added to governmental difficulties. The traditional independence of the Northern Emirates in whose territory lives more than half the total population, made the central legislative council as established in 1947 an awkward medium for government. Under the guidance of the Governor, Sir John Macpher-

son, a revised constitution on a federal basis was drawn up. During the negotiations the Emir of Zaria insisted, on threat of withdrawal to the position which prevailed before amalgamation in 1914, that the North must control half the seats in the legislature and be allocated central revenue on a *per capita* basis. In the event the approved devolution of powers to regional governments in the 1952 constitution proved inadequate.

This failure, in its first form, of federal government in Nigeria has served to emphasize the differences of race, religion and interest not only between the Moslem North and the South, but between the Ibo people in the East and the Yoruba in the West. So far Dr. Azikiwe's attempt to turn the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons into a genuinely Nigerian, as opposed to Ibo, party has largely failed in the face of what appears to be aggressive Yoruba nationalism on the part of the Action Group led by Mr. Awolowo. Neither of these politicians, the one by accident and the other by design, was a member of the central House of Representatives elected in 1952. At the same time they have both declared themselves in favour of "self-government by 1956"—a slogan which the Northern region generally distrusts because it might involve its domination by the lively politicians of the coast. Only by skilled chairmanship did Mr. Lyttleton at the constitutional conference at Lagos at the beginning of the year, succeed in postponing a discussion of the possible right of a region to secede from the federation. Unless present tensions can be mitigated and a sense of Nigerian nationalism generated, federation may, in this case, prove a prelude to disintegration rather than, as often, to unity.

By comparison with this critical situation the obstacles in the way of the proposed Caribbean federation, though more complex, are far less dangerous. Whereas in Nigeria federation provides, at any rate temporarily, a *modus operandi* to enable the survival of one state, the West Indian federation, which is not at present likely to include the mainland territories of British Guiana and Honduras, might well save from economic peril the smaller colonies in the area. Basically the reason for federation is a matter of size. The smallest of the three regions of Nigeria has more than 7,000,000 inhabitants: the sum total in the British West Indies is 3,000,000, of whom 1,500,000 are the descendants of negro slaves, a million of them in Jamaica. The obstacles to the scheme are partly, though remarkably slightly, racial, in that the East Indian minority, mainly in Trinidad, would resent negro domination, and partly economic, for the obvious reasons that those islands which are capable of standing on their own feet do not relish supporting their weaker associates and those that are comparatively lightly populated do not want an influx of labour from the crowded areas. On the other hand, only co-operation can encourage investment and provide the home market which is essential to the development of light industry in the area. The whole project depends to some extent on a vast improvement in communications over an area of sea well over one thousand miles across.

In the modern world the small economic unit has little chance of survival: this is, as has been shown by example, likely to encourage the formation of federations. There are, for instance, few colonies left within the British Empire which are likely to be able to stand the strain of what used to be called "dominion status" on their own. For other than these

amalgamation or federation is almost inevitable. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that federal government by reason of its multiple nature is necessarily second best in effectiveness to a unitary system. It tends to be more conservative, and is certainly more cumbersome and expensive to operate: the taxation levied is likely to be proportionately higher. There are, however, circumstances where diversity of interest of some kind makes it the only acceptable method of formal co-operation. It is likely, for instance, to prove the means of breaking down those artificial frontiers created sixty years ago by the European scramble for Africa. Dr. Nkrumah is known to have visions of a great West African state embracing both British and the intervening French territory—a state which could scarcely be other than federal. The agitation recently started by Ashanti leaders in Kumasi for regional autonomy on a federal basis within the Gold Coast itself might, however, have a braking effect on such an ambitious but almost certainly desirable scheme. There is little doubt that federation still has a great part to play in the creation of regional economic stability, and it may even prove a useful practical method for securing peace in large areas of the world. W. F. GUTTERIDGE.

Lecturer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF TRADE UNIONS

THE British trade union movement, with its nine million members, is to-day the most highly organised section of the British people. The trade unions have reached a position of such great numerical strength and social influence that Ministers are often in consultation with union leaders, not only on the problems of wage claims and hours of work which arise directly from industrial relations, but on other problems such as the exports drive, increased production, the administration of the social services, etc. Every Government in Great Britain, be it Labour or Conservative, depends to a considerable extent upon the goodwill of the trade union movement in the carrying out of those national policies which involve the interests of trade union members. Examples of this goodwill are to be found in the trade union acceptance of the wartime orders covering compulsory arbitration in trade disputes, direction of labour, etc. This co-operation between the government and the trade unions has been most noticeable since 1945. There is no doubt that when Sir Stafford Cripps formulated his policy of wage and dividend restraint he knew that its success depended upon the support of the Trades Union Congress. The trade unions have played an important part in the nationalisation programme, and, as is well known, the nationalised industries have recruited many responsible executives from all administrative levels of the trade union movement. For these reasons it is often stressed that modern trade unions in Britain have grave responsibilities as well as undeniable rights. This development of the trade unions brings into prominence a new type of public figure—the trade union leader—who is important enough—especially when occupying the higher positions—to be taken into the

Government's confidence. Trade union leaders are unique in that nearly all are men and women who have learned their profession—and modern trade union leadership is a profession—in the difficult school of personal experience. Most of the present-day leaders have progressed from the workshop floor or bench, the coal-face, or the bus conductor's platform to positions of great national responsibility; though it is often pointed out that while general secretaries and national presidents have responsibilities as great as those of executives in the top levels of industry the trade union national official's salary is only a fraction of what industry pays to a person with similar qualifications. Trade union leaders acquire these qualifications through years of practical work and training. Those who take on responsibilities, even in the lower levels of trade union organisation, must study a great many subjects which ordinarily they would not have the opportunity to learn. Branches are constantly in need of spare-time secretaries, treasurers, chairmen, committee members, etc. The responsibilities of these positions introduce trade unionists to a variety of interesting subjects. Branch secretaries, for example, must study secretaryship, the technique of business correspondence, and learn systematically to file records. They must also study the rules of the organisation to which they belong. This is essential because the rules of some trade unions are so amazingly complicated that the ordinary members never trouble to read them. Branch secretaries therefore must act as interpreters of the rules. They must also be conversant with a great number of regulations relating to workers' rights under the various social service acts, factory legislation, workmen's compensation and so on. They are expected to have a working knowledge of the national and local agreements between employers and unions. They must study these matters so that they will be competent to advise members on the many problems which they are often faced with and which are inevitably brought to the branch secretaries for solution. Trade union branch secretaries are often consulted about income tax problems and in the signing of official forms—though they may be only spare-time nominally paid officials—they are considered to be the embodiment of the same measure of social responsibility as doctors, clergymen, civil servants or other professional ranks.

Trade union branch secretaries usually work in close co-operation with the branch treasurers who often handle quite large sums of money. Treasurers must have some little knowledge of banking, finance, and book-keeping. Many branch treasurers also act as visitors to the members on sickness benefit and thus acquire some knowledge of the qualifications needed for that special type of social work. Branch chairmen in order to run their meetings efficiently must learn the rules of procedure and debate and public speaking. To assist trade union chairmen the trade union movement has issued a number of excellent text books on chairmanship. Trade unions spend a lot of money on specialised educational work, and many unions have made arrangements for their members to receive free correspondence courses on subjects that would enable them to carry out their duties more efficiently. These courses cover economics, finance, secretaryship, chairmanship, industrial management, industrial relations, statistics and similar subjects. Almost every aspect of modern industry is covered in the educational schemes of the trade unions. Besides postal

courses many trade unions provide residential courses at summer and week-end schools. Some trade unions provide special full-time courses of at least one month's duration to enable trade union officials to study the techniques and problems of industrial management. Trade unionists who become members of their area or district committees are introduced to the work of government departments and the local administration of the social services. Trade unions are directly represented by members working at their ordinary jobs on Local Ministry of Labour Appeals Tribunals and Courts of Referees. Local health and welfare and education authorities, often benefit from the advice and assistance of the trade unions. Members of area and district committees are also in touch with the various employers' organisations with whom they discuss all kinds of problems from wages and hours of work to first aid and the provision of sports facilities. This makes them realise the importance of research, of the orderly arrangement of ideas, and of the proper presentation of a case.

While some trade unionists devote a lot of their time to branch and district committee work—keeping the apparatus of the unions in working order—others turn their attention to the activities of the unions in the workshop. These are the shop stewards and works committee members. They are the trade unionists with the most difficult tasks, but here again they come into contact with problems which the less interested worker would never have the opportunity to study. In consultations with management the shop stewards and works committee members learn something of the rudiments of industrial management and organisation, the techniques of production, and the problems of personnel management. This is particularly so if good relations prevail, if the shop stewards and works committee members are not afraid to ask for information, and if the management are not too narrow-minded to take the workers into their confidence. Joint production committees which were introduced during the war have given many trade unionists an insight into the many problems that face management in modern industry. On these committees the trade union members are encouraged to put forward fresh ideas on production methods, distribution of materials, factory lay-out and personnel organisation. These are good reasons why progressive managements are beginning to recruit their supervisors, their work study experts, their welfare officers, and in many cases their personnel managers from the ranks of the shop stewards and works committee members. Management realises that the active workshop trade unionist can usually see and appreciate both sides of the problems that arise in industrial relations. The British trade union movement in its long and colourful history has been moulded and seasoned into the national institution it now is. The employers—though hostile in previous generations—are now quick to recognise the value of trade unions in industry, and to admit that their employees' organisations are an integral part of the modern set-up. For these reasons they prefer to discuss the many problems that arise between workers and employers with the representatives of organisations that have proved themselves to be serious, responsible and business-like and, from many points of view, a force of great social significance.

ANDREW BOYD.

KENSINGTON GARDENS IN SUMMER

*Salvoes of sun blaze at him, stepping dazed
From obfuscated office and dimly defiant over
Zebra stripes dodging, to where the tranquil trees
Of the Gardens quiver quintessence of green against blue.
Beyond the plump pigeons on the Broad Walk, busily
Purpling with disdain at a surfeit of crusts,
He embraces the cool ecstasy of towering chestnuts,
Between which recumbent shapes, inelegant, yet
Not unlovely in the soft ebb and flow of breath,
Drink dreams rich in the warm gold of the sun.
Here ineffectual cries of women, who exude
Doting remonstrance upon disobedient dogs,
Intruding startle the low homophonous murmur
And measured diapason of the distant Gore,
Till, over the lilting crest, inexplicably near
Shines the brittle silver of the Serpentine.
Then smugly intolerant with derisive glance
At the Memorial's crowded cornucopia
Of piety, he turns exuberant to view
Brigades of gladioli in their glory shouting
Their clash of colour and heraldic harmony.
Once more over the zigzag Zebra dodging,
He turns the leaden ledgers the long afternoon,
Cherishing his sunlit memory of green and blue
Inextricably tangled with visions of gold hair.*

A. N. GILKES



LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

HOLSTEIN, BISMARCK AND WILLIAM II

Students of German diplomacy under Bismarck and his successors have long looked forward to the publication of the papers of Friedrich von Holstein, commonly known as the *Eminence Grise* or the Mystery Man of the Wilhelmstrasse, who helped to shape foreign policy from the fall of Bismarck in 1890 till his own retirement in 1906. We have constantly met him in the memoirs and biographies of his contemporaries, and now at last we hear his story told by himself. This good fortune we owe to our victory in the Second World War and the consequential removal to England of the archives of the German Foreign Office. The fate of his papers since the death of the old bachelor in 1909 is described by the editors in the Introduction, which also supplies a brief survey of his career and of the writings, diaries and correspondence. To judge by the first instalment of this important enterprise they have performed their task with conspicuous success. Brief elucidations and biographical details of the many persons mentioned in the text are provided in the notes. Handsomely produced, with large print on thick paper, the book is a marvel of cheapness at 25s.

The name of Holstein only became widely known when the disappearance of the Iron Chancellor left the most experienced official in the Foreign Office in partial command at the age of fifty-three. When his long apprenticeship in various foreign posts ended with his recall to Berlin in 1876 he had seen service in St. Petersburg, London, the New World, Italy and France, and had won Bismarck's entire confidence. About half of this volume, which only contains about 200 pages, is concerned with the opening phase of his career, vividly described in recollections written at various dates before and after his retirement. "These memoirs of mine," he explained in the last year of his life, "are meant to portray, without any strict order, those impressions of my life which I still remember clearly, just as they come into my head." When he became something like a dictator in the Foreign Office, with power to make or mar the career of professional diplomats, he had the reputation of misusing his power and pursuing vendettas with pathological intensity. One of the reasons for looking forward to future instalments is the chance of learning how far this unenviable reputation was deserved, and, if so, on what mysterious grounds his power rested. His ability, untiring industry and intensive knowledge of the European scene were universally admitted, but was that sufficient to explain the unique position of a civil servant? Did he possess secret information which compromised highly placed individuals, among them Bülow and Eulenburg, as is sometimes believed? At present, no final answer is possible.

The spirit of the Iron Chancellor broods over the stage during the earlier part of the drama, that of William II over the later chapters. So close was the author's association with the founder of the Reich that we listen eagerly to his testimony. Starting his official career in 1860 at the age of twenty-three at St. Petersburg where Bismarck was Prussian Minister, he portrays his chief without affection. "He was forty-five, slightly bald, with fair hair turning grey. Never gay, even when telling amusing anecdotes, a thing he did only occasionally in particularly congenial company. The total impression was one of a dissatisfied man, partly a hypochondriac, partly a man insufficiently reconciled to the quiet life in St. Petersburg. His every utterance revealed that for him action and existence were one and the same thing. The main attraction of his Frankfurt period was that it was one of constant strife. His attitude to the diplomatic corps was one of indifference. The black moods to which he was so frequently a prey were due as much to physical as to mental strain. I have scarcely ever known anyone so joyless as Bismarck." He found the Minister's very limited wife equally

unattractive. "Her only attraction was a pair of arresting dark eyes. She was entirely devoid of feminine charm, attached no importance to dress, and only lived for her family. Bismarck displayed considerable nobility of character in the way he bore with his wife's inept behaviour which was at times appalling. He never winced at it, but would on rare occasions gently admonish her." The unloving official never felt the slightest affection for his unloving chief and after the final breach denounced his character and a good deal of his policy. In studying this volume we must bear in mind the date at which each portion was written. Neither Holstein nor anyone else will ever say the last word on the Iron Chancellor.

After short spells in Rio de Janeiro, at Prussian headquarters in the Danish campaign of 1864, in the Prussian Embassy in London (where, as he records, Prussians were detested owing to the spoliation of Denmark) and in Washington, Holstein began to play an important part during the Franco-German war of 1870, when he joined Bismarck's secretariat at Versailles which included Busch and Lothar Bucher, Abeken and Keudell. The Chancellor's confidence resulted in his remaining in France for five years after the return of peace. He describes vividly the horrors of the Commune in Paris and the recovery under the veteran Thiers, the only Frenchman of whom Bismarck spoke with respect. Intimate association with his chief in France had not increased his liking or respect:

After 1871 I never heard of one single example of his self-control. On the contrary, I gradually formed the opinion that he sought the reward for his achievements in refusing to bow to anyone's will but his own, and in obliging everyone with whom he had official contacts to comply with his whims. If he had been a professional soldier he might well have gone to war more often. He had acquired so much for the German Empire and for himself that he had no desire to embark on another game for high stakes. I heard him say: "You know where a war begins, but you never know where it ends." I am firmly convinced that is why he had not the remotest intention of provoking a war with France in the spring of 1875. He only wanted to intimidate the French and put an end to the insulting behaviour they had indulged in ever since the war. It was bad enough that he undoubtedly took pleasure in alarming people.

Holstein has little to say about the fierce quarrel between Bismarck and Arnim, the Ambassador in Paris. The charge that he spied on his chief and aided the Chancellor to secure his ruin is passed over in contemptuous silence. "When Arnim began to work for the Bourbon restoration, Bismarck decided to transfer him. I had myself recommended his transfer in two or three letters to Bucher for the sake of peace and quiet. That is my real share in the Arnim affair." Holstein believed that the restoration of the monarchy would be dangerous to peace and that the Chancellor was quite right to discourage the project on the ground that a king might secure allies for a *Revanche* with less difficulty than a young Republic. The essence of his policy after the foundation of the Reich was to keep France in quarantine by remaining on such good terms with the other great Powers of Europe that none of them needed her as an ally. "We have had enough," he declared, and he meant what he said.

As Bülow's voluminous Memoirs are a long indictment of his old master William II, so Holstein's reminiscences denounce the character of his old chief in unmeasured terms:

It was a psychological necessity for Bismarck to make his power felt by tormenting, harrying, ill-treating people. His pessimistic view of life, which had long since blighted every human pleasure, left him with only one source of amusement, and future historians will be forced to recognise that the Bismarck regime was a constant orgy of scorn and abuse of mankind, collectively and individually. One of the greatest difficulties in dealing with him was his complete contempt not only for mankind but for the truth as well.

His personal dislike of Gortchakoff as manifested at the Berlin Congress in 1878

is described as a costly blunder, for behind the Russian Chancellor stood the Tsar, who never forgave Bismarck for his lukewarm support of Russian claims in the Near East. "*J'aime mon oncle*," remarked Alexander II of the Emperor William, "*mais Bismarck est une affreuse canaille*." His dislike was shared by his son Alexander III, who delivered France from isolation by forming the Dual Alliance. Bismarck's attempt to retain contact with Russia in the secret Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 is described as political bigamy, in other words as disloyalty to the Austrian ally. The Iron Chancellor's fall occurred at the moment when the treaty of 1887, which ran for three years, was due for renewal, and the first decision of his successors, in which Holstein played a leading part, was to drop it—in his opinion, the only honourable course.

The closing chapters are dominated by the colourful but unsubstantial figure of the Kaiser, who receives rather more lenient treatment than Bismarck, the enemy of them both. The two men scarcely ever met. Holstein was well aware that the ruler was not the main architect of German policy, with the important exception of the building of the fleet, a decision he never approved: like the old Chancellor, he preferred limited liability to the risky adventure of *Weltpolitik*. In dealing with Anglo-German relations he finds fault with both sides. England, he declares, could not be surprised at the antagonism, "because for decades she had indulged in unfriendly and inconsiderate actions against Germany, and previously against Prussia." Germany, on her side, was to blame for the naval challenge, the Kruger telegram (for which he disclaims all responsibility) and the Kaiser's public indiscretions, above all the *Daily Telegraph* interview. A good deal of harm had been done by the Empress Frederick. "She had come to Berlin firmly bent on reforming Prussia to her own taste, that is on English lines." He adds that her plans for reform were not always liberal in character. "She always put English interests first, and regarded it as the main task of Prussian and German policy to act as cat's-paw to England." These scathing words might have been written by Bismarck himself, and indeed Holstein belongs by conviction rather to the Bismarckian than to the Wilhelmian era symbolised by the *Flottenpolitik* and the Bagdad Railway. Everyone knows of his close association with Bülow, for whom he finds excuses in his handling of the *Daily Telegraph* affair which are unlikely to convince.

The whole volume is of interest and the later chapters are of first-rate importance. Like almost all political apologias, it presents the author throughout as wise and far-sighted and his superiors as responsible for the errors which he deplores. The frontispiece of the old official in his seventieth year suggests a far more formidable personality than his narrative appears to indicate, and indeed students of the memoirs of the period are aware of the terror he inspired. We shall look forward to further instalments of the papers of a man who held a unique position in the Reich and of whom—personally unattractive though he is—the historical student can never learn too much.

G. P. GOOCH.

The Holstein Memoirs. Edited by Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher. Cambridge University Press. 25s.

GERMAN HISTORY FROM A NEW ANGLE

Professor Koppel Pinson is a distinguished American historian from the school of Professor Carlton Hayes, and this book is a most valuable contribution to the understanding of modern Germany, based on an extremely wide and careful study and written with great impartiality, critical acuity and penetrating psychology. He has further been helped in his interpretation by close personal observation since he has been able to visit and study Germany before, during and after Hitler's regime. He tries to attain a deeper understanding of the political movements by examining the social, economic and cultural background and by

giving special attention to the political literature and the press. His aim is the understanding of public opinion and the ideologies determining politics, thus continuing the tradition of the school which has laid particular stress on the study of nationalism. It is, indeed, a very fruitful approach which gives us more insight into the mind of the people than the mere study of dispatches and other official documents. But it has also the disadvantage that it takes much space and that it is difficult to combine the presentation of many different lines of development in one concise picture. The book, therefore, in many places tends to assume the character of a series of essays. Certain problems are more fully treated than in the conventional, predominantly political history, while others are only glanced at. There is, for example, no presentation of the diplomatic origin of the war of 1914. Professor Pinson rejects the still popular view which attributes the outbreak of World War I to malice aforethought. No one deliberately planned or willed the war, he says. "As for Germany, there is no shred of evidence that either William II or any of his ministers deliberately planned and plotted the war." He further thinks that in a war there is always some justice and some wrong on each side, but that Germany must bear the major share of responsibility in the outbreak of the first war, and still more in that of the second.

In all this Professor Pinson is, of course, absolutely right, though in my opinion at least the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, General Conrad von Hotzendorf deliberately planned a war which appeared to him necessary to frustrate the aggressive designs of Austria's enemies. The great majority of Austrian ministers, diplomats, generals and politicians, however, would probably have rejected this idea if they had had a chance. However this may be, it is certainly true that war guilt, though a reality, is a much more complex and evasive matter than the primitive generalisations dominating politics and even the writings of certain historians. The idea that a whole people should be guilty and ought to be treated as outcasts is still more absurd. Professor Pinson is also critical of visitors to Germany in the years after the last war who expected confessions of guilt from every German and who expressed their dissatisfaction with the alleged lack of shame. "Too often the demands for a change of heart were in bad taste and crude. Sensitive anti-Nazi Germans often found themselves berated rudely and violently for the very things which they themselves had fought against at peril to their own lives."

The author's views cannot be fully discussed in a review. Apart from specific questions, however, the general aspect of history demands a revision, particularly in the minds of writers trying to formulate the lessons of history to influence public opinion. In most cases history is still conceived as a preponderantly rational process. It is naïvely assumed that not only statesmen and intellectuals but even the man in the street foresaw the remote consequences of their actions, wishes and opinions and that they approved them. Actually the student of politics again and again cannot help feeling: Forgive them—they know not what they do. Even the best intentions, for example the ardent wish for peace, may lead to the worst consequences. Another frequent error is the projection of the tendencies of our days into the past. Some historians and psychologists found Hitler's spiritual ancestors in the whole course of German history. If they had compared the facts adduced with contemporaneous happenings in other comparable nations they would have come to very different conclusions. History is an extremely complex structure which is for many reasons difficult to understand, except to those who devote to it very wide and intensive study. Anyhow, Professor Pinson has made an admirable contribution to the urgently required revision of historical misconceptions.

FREDERICK HERTZ.

Modern Germany: Its History and Civilisation. By Koppel S. Pinson. Macmillan, New York. 35s.



OVER HIS OWN SIGNATURE

A Study of Christ's Pictures of Himself and of their Relevance to our Lives today

By Dr. Leslie D. Weatherhead
President of the Methodist Conference

In this book, Dr. Weatherhead tells us that he feels nothing can be more important, either for the man outside the churches or for the devout member within them, than what he calls "looking at Jesus."

10s. 6d. net

I WENT TO MOSCOW

By Mervyn Stockwood

Canon Stockwood went to Moscow to see for himself, and his book records the impressions of a lively and inquiring mind. He saw what and whom he wanted, even interviewing the Patriarch of All Russia.

15s. net

SCIENCE AND MODERN LIFE

By Sir E. John Russell,
O.B.E., D.Sc., F.R.S.

(The Beckly Lecture for 1955)

The lecture deals with some of the problems arising out of the rapid advance of science and technology. There are signs of happier relations between science and religion, and therein lies the best hope for the future.


7s. 6d. net

CAPTIVES TO FREEDOM

By Douglas W. Thompson

This vivid and moving book, written by an army padre who was captured at Tobruk, and lived in P.O.W. camps in Italy and Germany, tells of the capture and of the succeeding life in camp, from a point of view that makes the story quite different.

10s. 6d. net



AUSTRIA

If any Englishman is qualified to sing the praises of Austria it is G. E. R. Gedye, who lived there as a singularly observant Correspondent for many years before and after the Second World War. He loves every town, every mountain, every valley, every lake, loves its food and its wines, its fishing, its flamboyant Baroque architecture, above all its people, so friendly, so easy-going, so full of the *joie de vivre*. *Introducing Austria* (Methuen. 18s.) will delight readers who know something of one of the loveliest and most interesting little countries in Europe, and will become an indispensable companion to the traveller who goes east in quest of new impressions. For the history of the Hapsburg Empire, the wars, the political and economic problems of the sorely tried Republic, we must look elsewhere; but for the churches and castles, galleries and restaurants, winter sports and motor routes we can ask no better guide.

G.P.G.

FRANCE

Dorothy Pickles' short volume on *France: the Fourth Republic* (Methuen. 8s. 6d.) should reach a wide circle of readers in the series of Home Study Books. She provides a very useful account of the French system of government under the post-war Constitution and of its operation in practice. She discusses the different political parties and trade unions, and summarises the main internal and foreign issues in French politics, since the war. She writes sympathetically of the "psychological malaise," the sense of frustration and futility, which has become the despair of France's friends. She concludes optimistically: in 1953 and 1954 there was a "new note of firmness and directness about some of the economic thinking . . . and a new pragmatism about some of the European thinking." A. de M.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Dr. S. Griffith, of the Library of Congress, has written a short but penetrating study specifically for the British reader. As the author discovered during his university lecturing in this country in 1951-2, there is here a widespread and disturbing ignorance of the basic characteristics of American government. In this volume, Dr. Griffith briefly describes and analyses the written Constitution, its formal institutions, the political bodies and conventional behaviour which go to make up the formal pattern of the political system. Upon this background, Dr. Griffith turns to his central theme, that "the American Government is largely a government of 'built-in' restraints." He explains the American method mainly in terms of balances and equilibria, between Legislature and Executive, state and national interests, law and individual freedom, "organisational responsibility . . . and the moral and intellectual integrity of the individual" and the competing interests of regional and economic groups. In the result there is no major and lasting change in national policy, at home or abroad, without 'consensus' or the substantial support among all regions and groups. This 'consensus' is the more tolerable in that individual states can adopt most changes in economic and social policy without waiting for the national approval. Dr. Griffith, of course, is fully aware of the defects inherent in this "system" particularly in foreign affairs; but he can justly say that it has served the American people well.

A. DE MONTMORENCY.

The American System of Government. By S. Griffith. Methuen: Home Study Books. 7s. 6d.

GENERAL FRANCO

Mr. Coles' intention is inadequately expressed by the sub-title: "A Full-length Biography." He has written a book defending the Spanish case in a wide context, but it is not really a life of General Franco. He admits that on a great many points concerning the youth and early life of his subject he has not found much documentation, while much of the later story is still too contemporary to allow a final judgement or a full analytical reconstruction based on documents. He also has to rely partly on other authors and partly on incomplete narrative, not to say on gossip. He does not adhere strictly to the chronological order, as a biographer is expected to do, and the 'popular style' irritates. I hardly think that in this century of specialist education lack of culture is already so universal that Rome needs to be defined as "the mecca of all devout Spaniards." Perhaps the English reader knows that Rome is older than Mecca as a holy place and that Spanish pilgrims go there as Catholics, not as "devout Spaniards." Palaces and cathedrals one might expect to see described by some other, more striking and personal, adjectives than the addition in telegraphic style of the century in which they were built. Rulers who, for good or for evil, left their mark on Spanish and European history should be otherwise characterised than as "Hapsburg Philip" or "Bourbon Charles." Finally, much as one may share the author's sympathy for two noble European nations, the Spaniards and the Swedes, there is no reason given in the book for the recurring parallels between notable Spaniards and Swedes (General Franco and Charles XII for instance), and only from the jacket will readers know that this Plutarchian touch is due to the fortuitous circumstance that the author is personally interested in these two countries; if he finds inner affinities we would like to know in what he sees them.

Still, when all these criticisms are made, it ought to be said that, with many shortcomings, this is a valuable book written in the service of a good cause, the fuller understanding between Britain and Spain, and that the author, though not a dispassionate witness, is not an uncritical enthusiast either. He lived in Spain before the Civil War and has visited the country several times since. He has

understanding and genuine sympathy for things Spanish, and if he makes no attempt to hide his admiration for his model, he is fair to the cause of General Franco's critics and opponents unless these latter are acting under the impulse of mere prejudice. Some facts not so generally known receive good treatment. It is a fair tribute both to General Franco and the Spanish people that flattery and adulation are not practised or encouraged in Spain. The man at the head of the Spanish State needs them no more than he needs fear to bolster up his position. In the course of his varied career as soldier, statesman and diplomat, his record can be subjected to cool and critical analysis. Fair-minded critics of General Franco will admit that he is more concerned with the good of Spain than with the popularity of his name. Anyone who has heard him speak, or read his speeches, knows that he never uses the repellent "I" of other "dictators" and that Latin and Mediterranean rhetoric does not prevent him from stating the problems facing his administration in sober terms.

Nevertheless, the historical observer is entitled to wonder what the final outcome of this experience in Spanish history will be. Dictatorship is in itself a form of government determined by circumstances, it is not necessarily an evil. It all depends how it is practised. It has its drawbacks, just like any other form of government. It is usually set up to restore "normalcy" and order after grave disturbances; its difficulty is how to find the way back to "normalcy" and order, for these notions are much less solidly established in the public mind than is generally supposed. The "Franco regime" emerging from a sanguinary civil war has become a Franco era. It has had its evolution, its inner transformation; its results have crystallized, it has shown its qualities and its shortcomings. Friends of Spain, like Mr. Coles, would do well to emancipate themselves from the controversial tone of the past. Sufficient time has passed for prejudices to be overcome. Books on Spain might now usefully concentrate on the evolution of the Spanish scene. The merits or demerits of every political era are ultimately judged by how far it was able to meet new needs. This book is a step in the right direction, if not an entirely satisfactory one.

BÉLA MENCZER.

Franco of Spain. By S. F. A. Coles. Neville Spearman. 21s.

CHRISTIAN FREEDOM

This is the final Report of a Commission of the Church of Scotland appointed to consider the effects of secular thinking, especially of Communism, on the life of the Church, and the Chairman, Dr. G. M. Dryburgh contributes a Foreword. Its significance lies in the fact that the Scots Church is prone to be more thorough and competent in its diagnoses of a situation than most Christian Communions, and it may therefore be taken as indicating what some of the best minds in the contemporary Church have to say. Communism, the authors of this Report declare, is only the open and public crystallisation of a secularist mood and temper which could almost claim to provide the ideology of the contemporary world. The enemy is materialism in any or all of its protean forms, subtly permeating the modern man's approach to life and controlling the direction in which he looks for solutions. That diagnosis made, the Report proceeds to indicate the points at which a genuine Christianity is relevant to and corrective of the tendencies which the authors see at work in several fields of human endeavour.

First, however, the Report has a welcome word concerning the nature of Christianity itself. It insists that Christian faith has a word to say to the whole of life and not merely to a part of it; it includes society as well as the individual in the scope of its proper concern. The main body of the Report therefore rightly begins with the central issue of freedom and personality and notes the tendency to the depersonalisation of man in industry and in the rise of totalitarian forms of life. As against that process it asserts the traditional Christian

valuation of the individual, though, curiously enough, it fails to note the influence of the method of science as distinct from the findings of science. Science can only proceed by noting similarities and neglecting the differences which make an individual thing what it is, and when human behaviour is concerned that reduces a man to an index number, one of a type. Hence one reads with a little astonishment the suggestion that we need a Christian sociology. Can you have a sociology in the strict sense of the term without depersonalisation? In turn the Report deals with the important questions of industry, the race problem, marriage, food and poverty. But while it is clear that there are certain great principles of Christian action which are relevant in all these fields, it lays special emphasis on the fact that the application of the principles has to be worked out by laymen, and it gives to the ordinary member of the Church genuine "middle axioms" for his consideration.

Good as this little book is, and deserving to be read by members of all Christian Communion, many readers will want to ask questions. Is the wholesale generalisation that materialism is the enemy true without qualification? Is not much of our so-called materialism rather the physical expression of muddled and imperfect spiritual principles? Is there sometimes an over-proneness to attribute solely to the fact of sin a disorder and strife which is at least as much due to sheer human creatureliness? In what sense are we to understand great but ambiguous words like freedom, justice and equality? Above all is there not a neglect of the fact that all habitual action tends to remove the act further and further from the centre of consciousness, and does that not mean in the realm of Christian practice that the very habituation to Church tradition has itself made God distant and unreal?

B. C. FLOWRIGHT.

The Church Faces the Challenge: The Report of the Church of Scotland on Communism. Longmans. 4s. 6d.

THE JEWS IN ENGLAND

In the preface to this study of the social history of the Jews in England in the last century, V. D. Lipman mentions the double aim of his book: to provide basic data on numbers, distribution, immigration and occupation, and to trace the developments of institutions and of the social and religious movements within the community. Anglo-Jewry is seen in a series of pictures at the significant dates of its development, in 1850, 1880, 1905, 1914 and ending with a survey of the period after 1914. These pictures are linked by shorter passages indicating the internal developments and external events which led to the changes marked. For it is a far cry from the 35,000 Jews in Great Britain in 1850—of whom about 20,000 lived in London with their strictly pyramidal social structure and occupations limited to finance, import and export trade, and petty retail trade—to the 450,000 Jews (280,000 in London alone) of 1950 with their diamond-shaped social structure and a much wider participation in a great variety of occupations.

The vicissitudes of this small community make interesting reading, and one is struck by its resilience and ability to equip itself with communal institutions and adapt its organization to changing conditions. It is a story of voluntary associations, synagogal, educational and charitable, and their attempts to impose unity and discipline on their members. It was only through the creation of such voluntary associations such as the Board of Guardians, the Beth Din, and various Friendly Societies that the great waves of immigration, dating from the assassination of Alexander II of Russia in 1881 and numbering about 100,000 between that date and 1905, were successfully dealt with and assimilated. It is to the credit of the English quality of Anglo-Jewry that the older body was able to absorb the immigrants. This was due, as the author takes pains to point out, to the process of anglicization without de-Judaization, developed in this country,

and the strength of the institutional framework which Anglo-Jewry had created. A great wealth of material has been compressed in a small space. The value of the book is enhanced by the maps, statistics, glossary and select bibliography appended. This well-documented and penetrating study was awarded the prize offered by the Jewish Historical Society of England for the best work on some aspect of the history of the Jews in England.

IRENE MARINOFF.

Social History of the Jews in England 1850-1950. By V. D. Lipman. Watts & Co. 18s.

MILTON AND KIERKEGAARD

"A man may be a heretic in the truth; and if he believes things only because his Pastor says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reasons, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy." So wrote John Milton in *Areopagitica*, but the words might as certainly have been written by Søren Kierkegaard, for despite the two centuries that separate them, these two valiant rhetoricians in the cause of freedom have more in common than is at first apparent. Milton was spokesman for a political revolution and Kierkegaard for a philosophical revolution. Both were writers in a manner that can justifiably be labelled Baroque, and both, in their own countries, were trenchant critics from within of the established Church of their times.

Kierkegaard, the centenary of whose death falls in this year, is one of the most frequently cited and least read of modern philosophers. His writings place him among the finest intellects of the nineteenth century and Mr. Auden has compiled an interesting, though lamentably limited, selection from his works. The influence exercised by the Danish philosopher's violent reaction against the Hegelian system of thought can hardly be over-estimated. He provided the match that touched off the many-coloured eruption of Existentialism, and he put the God-man relationship back in the vital centre of philosophy after the speculative thinkers of the age of Enlightenment had driven God and man far apart. In his brave attempt to extract sufficient relevant passages from Kierkegaard's voluminous writings to present a unified impression of his thought, Mr. Auden faced a formidable task which he has solved in part by regarding his subject as, "neither a poet nor a philosopher, but a preacher." Such an approach is based on a blatant over-simplification, but it is not easy to see how otherwise a coherent book of under two hundred pages could have been devised. As a popular introduction to Kierkegaard's writings it would have been of greater value had Mr. Auden seen fit to indicate his sources—in a brief appendix or at the end of each extract.

In the sixth of the Clark lectures, delivered at Cambridge last year, Mr. Robert Graves said that Mr. Auden "is as synthetic as Milton." Whether or not this constitutes a calumny in respect of Kierkegaard's latest editor, it is true that Professor Muir devotes much of his restricted space to earnest enquiry into the sources from which Milton borrowed so lavishly for his epic poems. This latest addition to the "Men and Books" series is, within the limits imposed by the needs of a popular study, a competent account of Milton's life and works. The controversies that have arisen over the past forty years around the person and poetry of Milton are not yet resolved, although the battle between critics and scholars has degenerated into spasmodic and half-hearted skirmishes about the flanks of Dr. Leavis' firmly established position. Milton may have been dislodged from the place he occupied next to Shakespeare in the hierarchy of English poets but he has not yet been reduced to the level of a minor poet. He has regained some lost ground and is, at the present time, one supposes, just where Dr. Leavis would wish him. Professor Muir is very conscious of the predicament in which he is placed by the absence of any generally accepted assessment of the poet's worth, particularly in view of the popular nature of his study. The impact of the critical argument has been too profound for him to ignore its implications

altogether, but he might have written a more stimulating book had he been less inclined to lean over backwards in his efforts to be fair to both sides. He is not a neutral and his championship of Milton is vitiated by continual attempts at compromise. The chapter on "Paradise Lost" is a conscientious search after the middle way but Professor Muir's defence is more effective against the interpretative criticisms of the late Professor Waldo than against the stylistic criticisms of Dr. Leavis. The author concludes, with studied ambiguity, that the poem "remains, with all its manifest imperfections, the most magnificent undramatic poem in the language" and that Milton's place is ensured "amongst the greatest English poets." While the battle ebbs and flows about the rotund glories of the epic poems, there remain the sonnets, the early poems and the prose, particularly the excellence of Milton's later prose style, so rightly admired by Andrew Marvell. Professor Muir's best chapter is on the early poems and his defence of "Comus" is vigorous and convincing.

Milton and Kierkegaard are representative to a striking degree of the ages in which they lived. Milton may not be the equal of Shakespeare and Kierkegaard may not be the most profound of philosophers, but both deserve the flattery of continuing study and, for the interested layman, these two books will provide reliable introductions.

B. EVAN OWEN.

Kierkegaard. Selected and introduced by W. H. Auden. Cassell. 12s. 6d.
John Milton. By Kenneth Muir. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

RENAISSANCE ART

So much loose talk about the Greek spirit in the Renaissance persists that Miss Simpson performs a valuable service in devoting a volume to this subject. It is unfortunate, however that the Greek inheritance has not been successfully disentangled from the Roman, admittedly a hard task. But it might have been more satisfying if both the sources of antique influences had been discussed together, since they confronted the Renaissance as a unity. Particularly rewarding is the detailed study of the position of the Medici in artistic and literary development, while the passages dealing with the three great masters, Leonardo, Michelangelo and Raphael are rather sketchy. Botticelli and Signorelli are adequately dealt with, based on the late Professor Warburg's studies of the Early Renaissance. The relationship between Italy and other parts of Europe is emphasised, with special reference to English literary traditions. This book should be useful to the student as a reference book, and gives valuable suggestions for further research and reading.

HELEN ROSENAU.

The Greek Spirit in Renaissance Art. By Lucie Simpson. The Ettrick Press. 18s.

FOUNDATIONS OF CULTURE

This important and stimulating book has an all too modest title; for it presents us with a long survey of the social evolution of literature as well. The author is in the wake of such modern sociological thinkers as Alfred Weber and Karl Mannheim who have analysed the subtle correlations between changing modes of thought or style and the social processes determining them. Dr. Hauser combines a Continental sociological training with an astonishingly wide knowledge of the history of art and literature. In this work, the fruit of many years of patient labour, he has brought together and reconsidered the findings and reflections of innumerable specialists. In more than a thousand pages he discusses the social foundations and implications of the development of culture from prehistoric times and the ancient urban civilisations of the Orient through Greece and Rome and the Middle Ages to renaissance, mannerism and baroque. Rococo, classicism and romanticism, and after them naturalism and impressionism, are set against the background of the societies from which they emerge and the volume ends with a penetrating analysis of the techniques of our own

"film-age." There are sections on the artist as magician and priest in pre-historic days, on the Greek tragedy as an instrument of propaganda, on the relations between feudalism and the romanesque style, on the middle class naturalism of the Florentine *quattrocento* and on the dissolution of space in the technique of mannerism. The baroque of the Catholic court in France is contrasted with that of the Protestant bourgeoisie in Flanders and Holland and the relation between the rise of the middle classes in England and the new reading public in the eighteenth century is examined. The involved attitudes of German and western romanticism towards the liberal and reactionary trends of the time are no less considered than the complex outlook of the French generations of 1830 and the Second Empire and the significance of the social novel in nineteenth century England and Russia.

Particularly valuable is the analysis of the role and the status of the producers of art and literature and of their consuming public in different periods. We are reminded that for a long time the only employers of artists were priests and princes, a fact which for instance helps to explain the formalism in Egyptian art of the Middle Kingdom. In ancient Greece and Rome there was a striking difference in the prestige enjoyed by the poet, celebrated as seer and prophet and the plastic or graphic artist whose wage was regarded as all he was entitled to. In the early Middle Ages the role of the Church in encouraging religious art was of paramount importance and for nearly three centuries the monasteries remained almost the sole homes of poetry. Then the place of the clerical amateur was taken by the knight as poet, who became the champion and mouthpiece of court chivalry. While the works of medieval literature reached only a very limited circle, the humanists of the Renaissance are the first authors to address themselves to a broader and often unknown public. They are also the first intellectuals to claim, though not always successfully, the privileges of rank and property. At the same time the prestige of the artist is raised to unheard-of heights and when Charles V stoops to recover the brush dropped by Titian, a new romantic idea of genius is manifest, on the subsequent development and pathology of which Dr. Hauser throws some interesting light. He also shows us the gradual emancipation of writers and artists from the ties of patronage and class in subsequent centuries and the social roots of the "*l'art pur l'art*" ideology, represented by Flaubert, Baudelaire and Oscar Wilde.

One may, of course, disagree with some of the interpretations and judgements of this book. For instance, when discussing German culture in the age of Enlightenment and afterwards, the author does not always display the same detached objectivity which distinguishes his chapters on England or France. One has there the impression that twentieth century experiences have to some extent coloured his explanation of earlier trends. Some chapters in this translation are more readable than others and laboured phrases like "knightly poetry," "courtly art" or the sentence "they (the intellectuals) were often intellectually conditioned by the father's pastoral calling" strike a jarring note. But these are minor deficiencies in a remarkable piece of work which gains in attraction by 145 well-chosen illustrations. Finally, it is gratifying to see that an author, who has applied the sociological approach to cultural phenomena to an extent hardly known before, admits that "Shakespeare's greatness can no more be explained sociologically than can artistic qualities in general."

E. BRAMSTED.

The Social History of Art. By Arnold Hauser. Two volumes. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 42s.

THE AUTHENTIC CRABBE

George Crabbe's position in English poetry, though firmly based, is still a rather curious one. With his roots dug well into the eighteenth century,

choosing for his chief medium of expression the elegant couplet of that time, he was, perhaps, the first of modern realists. Although he had none of Wordsworth's vision of the transcendental quality of nature, Crabbe was nevertheless nature's loving and exact observer (he took an interest in botany and entomology) and it is possible that only Tennyson equalled him in accuracy of observation, though Tennyson had a much more developed sense of nature's ornateness, or even quite simple beauty. Crabbe was acknowledged by Tennyson to have "a world of his own."

Whether we approach poetry from the point of view of beauty or of social awareness will make all the difference to our estimate of Crabbe's considerable achievement. "Pope in worsted stockings"—well, why not?; until we remember that this epigram arrived in an age with no very high opinion of Pope himself. Yet Hazlitt was able to write of Mr. Crabbe as "one of the most popular and admired of our living authors" in 1825, though that popularity was soon extinguished; and in a well-known line Byron said of Crabbe's work as a whole: "Though nature's sternest painter, yet her best." But today, in spite of Benjamin Britten's opera, *Peter Grimes*, and the fact that Crabbe's realism certainly pointed forward to Hardy, it is doubtful if Crabbe's work has made much progress in regaining popularity. What I think distinguishes Crabbe, when he is writing of the social evils of his time, from the group of poet-pundits of the 'thirties, is that Crabbe never shouts, is never strident; his effects are far more subtly and permanently obtained; so that perhaps he will always have his few devoted admirers and must remain something of a scholar's poet.

Mrs. Haddakin's book is the first, so far as I know, that has appeared in this country devoted entirely to the criticism of Crabbe's poetry, and is authoritative, painstaking and thorough. As such it is to be warmly welcomed; it fills a gap; and we may hope that it will win many new converts to Crabbe's many excellencies as a truthful and ironical delineator of the — often shockingly grim — annals of the poor of his day; for it makes clear both his imaginative skill as a story-teller and his humane psychological insight into character. Though many of the tales are keyed low, they are saved by Crabbe's wit and humour. Of course if we should happen to agree with Walter Bagehot that "the character of the poor is an unfit topic for continuous art" then we must write off Crabbe as too hopelessly pedestrian and admit frankly that he bores us. But I doubt if many readers, who are prepared to give time and careful attention to Crabbe will feel this. He possesses too much sympathy for humble people, too much social benevolence. If he had lived today, he might well have written short stories.

Let us not, however, make the mistake of putting the case for a revival of interest in Crabbe too high. "Crabbe," writes Mrs. Haddakin, "though an imperfect poet, is an authentic and original one. It is not that, by some sleight of hand, or by unprecedented doggedness, he manages to drag recalcitrant material up to the lower slopes of Parnassus. Rather, by a power of vision that can penetrate crass surfaces, and a power of expression that can convey at once a sense of crude fact and an intimation of persuasive and meaningful process, he succeeds in conducting us through the dingy and trivial to the gradually incandescent."

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

The Poetry of Crabbe. By Lilian Haddakin. Chatto and Windus. 12s. 6d.

NOVELS

A feeling for the work of a writer may be so great as to amount, in the reader's view, to almost a personal relationship; and a new novel from such a source will excite much the same sense of apprehensive pleasure as an encounter, after years, with a loved one whose features may in the interval have changed. This is perhaps fanciful; what is certain is that translations from foreign novelists seldom

affect the reader in quite this way. They will cause him rather to wonder as to the place of the author in his own literature, and as to the nature of his following. Some knowledge of foreign preferences in English fiction may introduce a certain cynicism into these reflections; but they are a part of those pleasures of reading which lie beyond the printed page.

In the case of M. Bosco the publishers obligingly make a comparison with Sheridan le Fanu and Edgar Allan Poe. The reason is plain enough, for if there is one question this author should ask of his audience, it is: 'Do you believe in ghosts?' Not ordinary house-ghosts, but ghosts which come to inhabit living men for purposes of their own:

No doubt remained; the Other loved. He still burned and he was trying to introduce his Shade into myself in order to make himself loved, even equivocally beneath this mask, by this woman whose blood flowed in his veins. . . . Through my living form this dead man, in future delivered from all our taboos, because it was I who bore his love, wanted at last to be loved. . .

The narrator is Meyrel, a scholar of ancient scripts, and the progress of the story is the progress of his awareness that the "Shade" of a man called Dumontel is striving to usurp his flesh and blood. The action proceeds in a lonely mansion in Provence, staffed by a lunatic gardener and by a housemaid who, if not actually insane, is in the highest degree eccentric. In such a situation almost anything can happen, and almost everything does. Dumontel's aim is the consummation, through Meyrel, of a passion for his living niece, Clotilde; but Meyrel's own desires conflict with Clotilde's love for her uncle in what is surely the oddest triangle ever devised. It is not easy to tell to what extent M. Bosco himself takes all this seriously, and perhaps it makes no difference. What does, I think, matter is that an act of belief in the reader presupposes certain things: such as that normal people shall seem to talk and behave in a normal way. For all his eloquence, M. Bosco's earthly characters never quite meet this test, and this makes it hard to have faith in his supernatural interventions.

There are two long stories, or two short novels, in the volume published under the title of *The Political Prisoner*. They are the work of an Italian writer who killed himself in 1950. The first concerns an engineer, a political offender, who is released from close confinement to exile in a remote coastal village. There, in a rather apathetic way, he enters into the lives of those around him; he broods on his situation but consoles himself with the woman who cleans his room. The second tale is about a girl called Ginia who, though not a bad girl at heart, is less careful than she should be in the company she keeps. As a result she embarks on an affair which ends in her humiliation. One might have called this a story of corruption had Ginia not seemed so prone to such a fate. What these narratives have chiefly in common is an apparent lack of point, although I fancy that the author takes this for a virtue. A less arguable failing is a flat descriptive style which etherizes the sympathy of the reader.

Much the most enjoyable of these three novels is that which seemed at first the least promising, Edward Frankland's *The Murders at Crosby*. The crimes in question happened a thousand years ago, and it was easy to fear a laborious recital of the customs of the Norsemen of that time. These do not go unmentioned, but Mr. Frankland so enlivens them as to make instruction a pleasure. Especially well drawn is the amorous Thora, whose love endangers those it visits. Less chaste and less regretful than Lady Macbeth, she is the equal of Shakespeare's lady in singleness of mind for her self-advancement. All these characters, indeed, emerge strongly from the few strokes that Mr. Frankland gives them. It is not his fault if in the end one decides that the nuclear age has its compensations.

JOHN EALES.

The Dark Bough. By Henri Bosco. Staples. 12s. 6d.

The Political Prisoner. By Cesare Pavese. Peter Owen. 12s. 6d.

The Murders at Crosby. By Edward Frankland. Dent. 12s. 6d.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

A theme that is ever fascinating heralds the month's reading, and not even this particular title can more than momentarily daunt the interest. FROM SWAN SONNENSCHN TO GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD. (10s. 6d.) begins with the schoolmaster's son who first studied medicine, and changed the Sonnenschein to his mother's equally sensational maiden name; the story is told by his daughter Miss Frances H. S. Stallybrass who is co-author with the late F. A. Mumby. The meeting with George Allen, Ruskin's engraver and business partner, lead to the absorptions and amalgamations so characteristic of the book trade, and to Sir Stanley Unwin waiting at Ruskin House to continue in due time this chronicle of team work faithfully done. In publishing, although doubts may dog, hope especially springs eternal. It is a quality that makes the chapter on John Ruskin so valuable and endears him still, even to our pessimistic generation.

Millions who multiply

With his passionate dreams of a golden age, he would have read attentively Lord Simon of Wythenshawe's pamphlet *SOME ASPECTS OF WORLD POPULATION* (*The Eugenics Society and Cassell*. 2s. 6d.). Idealist and cynic alike are reminded of the hard facts of too many mouths to feed. Birth control should be at least as successful as death control; the latter has been due to Government action, the former has not. Under-developed countries—three-fifths of the human race—are examined, and the dangers of an industrialised but over-crowded Japan. In fifty years, if the present trend continues, the number of people now in the world will have doubled. "Slower increase in population will give more time for technology to produce alternative supplies."

The task of Jacob Rosin and Max Eastman is to show how chemistry may point *THE ROAD TO ABUNDANCE* (*Rider*. 12s. 6d.). They discuss our

present bondage to plant and mine and urge a breaking down of suspicion against synthetic foods and mineral replacements; mechanical brains, creative leisure, free raw materials and abundance to eat would create a war-proof world. One recalls that Lord Samuel's memorable *Unknown Land* had all these advantages—but the inhabitants underwent a change of heart as well. And Lord Boyd Orr's *Introduction to the Rosin and Eastman book* fears that "the human race has not yet evolved to the stage of maturity which would enable all Governments to co-operate in promoting the welfare of all mankind." The vision of the authors, he truly concludes, should inspire people to hustle their rulers.

Rigorous travel

Revulsion from rulers who fostered the intellectual darkness of the fifteenth century by their own lawlessness and incompetence, culminating in civil war, helped to send a scholar from Oxford to Rome where "he proved to the incredulous Italians that an Englishman could compete with the best of their humanists on equal terms." JOHN FREE (*Longmans, Green*. 25s.)—symbolic patronymic—is R. J. Mitchell's imagination-fired and scrupulously documented account of the bookman's arduous itinerary, which included schooldays at Bristol, eleven years at Oxford University, two in Ferrara, four in Padua, four at the papal court of Pius II and Paul II, and death there at the age of thirty-five. Steeped as Mr. Mitchell has been since boyhood in thoughts of Free and his companions, it is not surprising that the cities of Italy, the landscapes, the austerities and the grandeurs of the Renaissance are keenly described, as if in fact by an eye-witness.

It was an actual and equally careful observer who kept *THOMAS CATHER'S JOURNAL OF A VOYAGE TO AMERICA* in 1836 (*The Rodale Press*. 5s.). This is another of the handsome Miniature Books, attributed to André Deutsch

Ltd. (who are the distributors) in "Books on the Table" for June. Writing at a time when the 'Grand Tour' did not usually include the New World, Cather is shrewdly aware of its crudities without being able to hide his recognition that here is a great nation in the making; as if, to it, his first-hand impression of President Jackson might well apply: "Possessed of undaunted courage and uncontrollable energy . . . almost all parties give him credit for honesty of purpose."

Steps in experience

The early memoirs of another very young man have been sympathetically translated by Michael Bullock from the German of Theodor Heuss, the President of the Federal Republic. *PRELUDES TO LIFE* (André Deutsch, 15s.) ties up chapters which can as easily be read separately into the indivisible narrative of Professor Heuss's intention, and it is plain "that the spiritual atmosphere of the turn of the century pervades the private and personal events related here." They took place between the introduction to the Heilbronn *gymnasium* in South Germany with good companions, a happy life at home, holidays and literary discoveries, through the semesters at Munich and a year at the University of Berlin, to "the tubby piece of pottery" reminding him of days that were gone. Political pre-occupations had begun to intrude but have never ousted his delight in the arts and history, and the liberal-mindedness behind his formative years has served the statesman well.

Not so admirable nor so engaging are the qualities exhibited in Peter de Polnay's recollections of his tempestuous youth. But as the reading of *FOOLS OF CHOICE* proceeds (Robert Hale, 12s. 6d.) a curious compassion takes the place of exasperated amusement, and the swift, vital flow of his pen begins to plead for tolerance and comprehension of the headlong adventures which he himself classifies as "unedifying, senseless, frequently sordid, and at times quite silly." In their

reaction from too organized and sheltered a childhood, he and his brother went to the furthest extreme of raw suffering in the Argentine and Brazil. Degradations, from park benches to filthy tram cleaning, and cheats in the underworld or around the *estancia*, visited the de Polnay boys unremittingly. The deliverance, when it comes in the nick of time in the shape of a large inheritance, seems strangely like anti-climax; and, if it were not that truth is stranger than fiction and the practised Peter de Polnay handling it, we should assume that the booking of state rooms, with £300 in ready cash, for the voyage home to England was a clumsy novelist's way of finishing a tale of which he had tired.

Marking history

The fiction of Kipling, A. E. W. Mason and E. M. Forster in relation to the Pakistani scene undergoes revaluation in a miscellany of writings on the new State, *CRESCENT AND GREEN* (Cassell, 10s.). With its ancient background and culture, and amid the clamour and dust of controversy, it has need of just such presentation and interpretation as these essays by authorities of varied nationalities provide. Arnold J. Toynbee, for example, examines it with an historian's eye; the Professor of Sanscrit in the University of Pennsylvania traces the bonds with western Asia; and art, the contemporary Urdu writer, and the philosophy of religion are some of the other aspects treated. Archaeology is responsible for most of the many good and varied illustrations, and it is Sir Mortimer Wheeler, sometime Adviser in Archaeology to the Dominion of Pakistan, who brings his own uncluttered and graceful prose—instinct with the drama and poetry of man's long and erratic journey—to the survey of "Pakistan Four Thousand Years Ago."

Then, its west-half region contained one of the oldest of civilizations, and was to have seventeen centuries more of flourish and decay before it came under

the influence of the Greeks. Into the Punjab and to the Indus valley they came, and these campaigns are part of the saga of conquest recounted by Agnes Savill in *ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND HIS TIME* (Rockliff. 25s.). Well might the oracle of Delphi pronounce this brave, handsome, brilliant and untiring son of Philip of Macedonia as "invincible." In the thirteen years of his reign he altered the whole outlook of his world and indelibly marked history. His final victor was not the wine bottle (he drank more than usual to allay the thirst of fever) but the mosquito, declares Dr. Savill, who as an eminent physician has a diagnostic advantage over the prejudice of chroniclers. Her handling of the controversies that have grown around Alexander's career is impressive, and her clear exposition of the Dismemberment and of the City-State is commended to student and teacher alike. Sceptics have read base motives into the concord prayer at the Feast of Reconciliation, but Dr. Savill makes sound her premise that Alexander was then unique in seeing God the ruler as father too, men not as Greeks and barbarians but as good and bad, and does not wonder that he was misunderstood.

How others live

Nowadays they are likely to be called Communists or non-Communists. But not by Marshall MacDuffie who after travelling 10,000 miles (from Moscow to the east and down to Samarkand, from Baku to the west and up to Leningrad, and thus through the eight republics that hold most of the population) brought home his original dislike of Communism and an increased fondness for its people. This American lawyer had been chief of the UNRRA mission to the war-and-drought-stricken Ukraine in 1946, and in 1953 he was granted a visa by Nikita Khrushchev, now First Secretary of the Communist Party, to return to Russia. *THE RED CARPET* (Cassell. 18s.) is full of unstressed information on housekeeping, wages, doctoring, the play, factory-farming,

school, shops, dancing, oil, advertising, clothes and social behaviour, and the seventy-five photographs are from Mr. MacDuffie's camera. Much of the Iron Curtain's fabulousness is swept away in a rush of commonsense about men, women, children and their homes; ideologies, politics and standards of living are not ignored, neither are they invoked to draw comparisons. This book ought to be at the hotel bedside of every non-Communist attending the Geneva Conference.

What they say

The title of *DOUBLE TALK* (George Allen & Unwin. 16s.) is not conciliatory, but at this time when the world dares to hope that co-existence may be a possibility and improved relations permanent, Harry Hodgkinson's alphabetical guide to the meanings that Russians give to words could be indispensable to a truly-desired *rap-prochement*. As an instance: 'co-existence' itself for us is live and let live: for the Communists it is live and let die because "they believe that rival systems to their own are doomed." Once the goal of unhampered intermingling of the peoples is achieved the ambiguities in 'abuse,' 'culture,' 'freedom,' 'liberalism,' 'realism,' 'sport,' 'universe,' 'warmonger' and other (to us) uncomplicated terms should be doomed too.

That "the languages of different societies do not make the same sense out of the same reality" is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis re-evaluated two years ago by a group of lecturers whose specialisms are psychology, anthropology, philosophy and linguistics. *LANGUAGE IN CULTURE* (University of Chicago and Cambridge University Press. 34s.) is a solemn and reference-citing volume that records their speeches and debates. To read it is difficult, with its "introverted-extroverted dichotomy" jargon; nevertheless the necessity of learning how people think, in Arabic or Zuni, is so urgent that perseverance becomes an obligation almost pleasurable.

GRACE BANYARD.

THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

HUNGARY AND THE NAZIS

Anyone trying to find a gleam of positive truth in the dusky chronicles of recent Hungarian history should read Nicholas Kállay's book as a counter-balance to Ferenc Nagy's *Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*. Both books are written by Hungarian expatriates who stress their dislike for the foreign regime that permitted their authority. The differences are soon obvious. Whereas the first believes that all was well in Hungary in Horthy's day (a view with which Sir Owen O'Malley in *Phantom Caravan* does not noticeably disagree), Ferenc Nagy knows too well the plight of the people. *Hungarian Premier* tells the story of the German occupation of Hungary. Nicholas Kállay may express enlightened views now and protest his faith in progress; but his actions at the time of his premiership are an indication of his merit and of how narrow his sympathies were. Under the Horthy regime very little was attempted to make the country democratic, and the abiding vision of pre-war days in Budapest is one of the poverty of the people and the luxury of the night clubs.

Hungarian politicians have an infinite capacity for being wrong. Ill-starred and talented, they have always been past-masters at the unhappy art of self-deception. They are like the soldiers in the poem: "Bravely they went to battle, but they always fell." Nicholas Kállay was typical of them, indefatigably taking the wrong side at the wrong time. Viewing his record with satisfaction he laments that the Hungary he knew is ended, and Dr. C. A. McCartney, in a somewhat unadventurous introduction to his book, joins him in this lament. But this unnecessary excursion into regret is so much sentimental folly. A country that has in the past done so badly for the welfare of its people does not deserve the civilised luxury of a continuous political constitution. War, and in particular the iron of the Russian occupation, should have done much to purge the souls of those whose bad government made pre-war Hungary a nation of emigrants and suicides. The land of Kossuth and Petöfi earned a revolution. It is a country in which there have always been men ready to die for a freedom they have never achieved. Now at last it has broken the links with that past political system which threw up so many opportunist and reactionary statesmen.

Russian oppression and Communism will not bring salvation to this unfortunate little country, but at least when in the future the time comes for political wisdom those discredited expatriates who supported a stand-still policy of feudalism and State-controlled poverty will have been swept into the dingier corners of history. The Hungarian people are like Chesterton's people of England. They have not spoken yet. When they do speak it will not be with the voice of Nicholas Kállay.

J. VIRAG.

Hungarian Premier. By Nicholas Kallay. Oxford University Press. 42s.

EARLY RUSSIAN HISTORY

Numerous studies in at least a dozen languages were written on the origin of Russia and its early history and for a long time controversial opinions were expressed by many writers on the subject. H. Pásziewicz takes it up again and discusses the difficulties which face historians who study this part of Europe. By a thorough examination of contemporary sources, Russian—in particular the Chronicle of "Nestor"—Jewish, Greek, Arabic and others, he sheds new light on eastern Europe; deals at length with the ethnical and political conditions of the various Slavonic tribes settled in the regions of the Dnieper, the Dniester, the Bug and the Volga; and describes the Finnish tribes and their territories as well as their relations with the Eastern Slavs in the Volga region. His remarks on the

significance of the term "Rus" are especially interesting as this term, according to the author, "acquired a variety of meanings in the course of time." He distinguishes between the geographical, political and religious meanings of the term, applying them to his historical accounts. He links the development of the Slavonic rite in the "Rus" with the activities of St. Cyril and Methodius and their disciples inside and outside Great Moravia.

The "eternal" controversy about the origin of the Russian State, represented by so-called "Normanists" and their opponents, is fully discussed. The author accepts the Varangian influences on the foundation of the Kievan Rusa, a view entirely rejected by the Soviet historians including Gregov, the most eminent of them. Bringing his story to the end of the fourteenth century, the author discusses the rise of Muscovy and the political circumstances which accompanied it, and deals with the role played by the Golden Horde as well as with the growth and importance of Lithuania at the time. He shows the period when the two States, Lithuania and Muscovy, competed for power, and how only because of the threat of the Teutonic Order to Lithuania and, at the same time, the decline in power of the Tartars there was created the opportunity for Muscovy to rise.

The book is a work of great learning, written with clarity and based on a critical examination of the sources. Its value is enhanced by the thirteen appendices to which over a hundred pages are devoted, treating certain points in detail which could not have been brought into the context, among others the historical importance of the *Tale of the Raid of Igor*. The bibliography recording about two thousand books and articles will undoubtedly be useful for a long time to the students of the period, especially those in the West. There are in addition two maps and five genealogical tables of the ruling houses of eastern Europe. This is one of the most scholarly books written on this period available in English.

PAUL SKWARCZYNSKI.

The Origin of Russia. By H. Paszkiewicz. George Allen & Unwin. 63s.

CHINA AND JAPAN

Both these books are for specialist students of the Far East. To such they are invaluable. Of the two Professor Kirby's demands more background knowledge on the part of the reader; for his book is essentially a comment on the bibliographies and source material—covering China's history from the dim past to the disintegration of the Manchus—that must be evaluated by any student of China's past. The present volume purports to be no more than an introduction to an economic history of China, and it whets the appetite for Professor Kirby's larger volume. The field is one which English scholars have neglected. Professor Kirby takes up arms against the sterile attempts of the Chinese Marxists to distort the variegated patterns of Chinese history to fit the well-worn Hegelian dialectic which Marx used to describe life in nineteenth-century England; he is rightly concerned at the way terms like "feudal" and "landlordism" are used as catchwords. For dogmatic attempts to assert parallel developments on the basis of analogies drawn from European history and society as seen through the eyes of Marx and Engels are the very negation of sound scholarship. The Kuomintang's share in strengthening this interpretation of China's past is not forgotten: "As thought was driven more and more underground, it passed more and more under the influence of Marxism." Chiang Kai-Shek's Government with its secret police and brutal attacks on "dangerous thinking" in the universities did a lot to strengthen academic Marxism. So long as China's present historians think in terms of the necessity of finding evidence to fit ready-made Marxist categories, we shall have to look outside China for the truth about her ancient past. Professor

Kirby has put students in his debt by revealing the rich storehouse of material existing in Japan, and the admirable work in this field carried on by Japanese sinologists.

The second book is concerned with the contribution of western firms in opening up China and Japan from the mid-nineteenth century, when commercial activity and exploration went together. The men who set up trading posts on the Chinese-Tibetan borders and who opened the Yangtse gorges to shipping were real merchant adventurers. There are some amusing items in these well-documented pages. We read of a firm in the 1840's that shipped large quantities of knives and forks to China, oblivious of the fact that the Chinese used chopsticks; another firm exported "a tremendous consignment of pianofortes." An Ipswich firm vainly tried to interest the Chinese Emperor in toy railway engines in the hope of getting the Son of Heaven interested in railway development. But the Emperor was not amused. In 1865 a twelve-mile stretch of line ran from Shanghai to Woosung. The Chinese bought this from Jardine Matheson twelve years later when it was running at a profit, dismantled it and threw the rails into the river. This typifies the economic backwardness of China and the conservatism which, even at the turn of the century, was reflected in the hostility to the West of the Empress Dowager. This is strikingly contrasted with the forward-looking attitude of the Japanese; they wanted to modernise Japan and had such an ordered government that there was no need for westerners to seek the privileges they demanded in China in the form of concessions and Treaty Ports. When Perry reached Japan in 1853 she was already changing. She used the West to make herself the equal of the West. But China's long reluctance to the changes forced upon her had the inevitable political repercussions. These still provide opportunities for her present-day economic historians to indulge that familiar xenophobia which is said to have originated in the Mongol invasion, and read the words "foreign presence" as "economic exploitation." These books are recommended reading for those who seek a light on the present that can come only from an understanding of the past.

BERNARD LLEWELLYN.

Introduction to the Economic History of China. By E. Stuart Kirby. Allen & Unwin. 18s.
Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan. By G. C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithorne. Allen & Unwin. 20s.

RESISTANCE AGAINST HITLER

It has sometimes been asserted that the Germans in writing the history of the recent past have been trying to gloss over the enormous crimes of Hitlerism and to whitewash the part which they themselves have played in the shocking tragedy which overwhelmed them in 1945. This book, written by one of Germany's most distinguished historians, proves abundantly that such assertions are as usual the result of an unwarranted generalisation. Professor Ritter makes no attempt to hide or even to minimise the enormities of Hitlerism; every page breathes the objective spirit of the best German historical writing while at the same time reflecting the author's abhorrence of everything Hitler stood for. He is particularly qualified to write about the German resistance to Hitler as he himself was an active member of it and suffered in prison for his convictions. Perhaps the very fact that he chose as the subject of his historical research the movement of moral and political resistance against Hitler within the confines of the Third Reich constitutes in itself an historical apology on behalf of the German people, but there is no doubt that the other Germany which emerges

was as real though, alas, not so effective as Hitlerism. The story of those who fought and fell in the struggle will always be remembered by men who believe with Burke that a whole nation cannot be indicted. We must be extremely grateful to Professor Ritter for having told this story in such a way that nobody who reads it can fail to be deeply moved.

The story proceeds with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy while it does not lack elements which border on the grotesque. Can anything more extraordinary be imagined than the story of Goerdeler, having been sentenced to death and awaiting execution, being commissioned by a Nazi ministry to write official memoranda about constitutional reforms in Germany, or of Himmler approaching him secretly with a view to using his connections in Sweden for peace negotiations? It was certainly a mad world in which both Hitler and his opponents had their being; and it is perhaps not surprising that the story of the conspiracy, in spite of the very real suffering and personal tragedies which it involved, reads partly like a fantastic melodrama, partly like an account of some ghastly nightmare. It is this nightmarish quality which makes the task of the historian so difficult, even impossible, and we might well ask ourselves whether we are not still too much emotionally involved in the events to see them in their correct perspective. Although Professor Ritter's book is undoubtedly one of the most important contributions yet made to our knowledge of recent German history and in its careful documentation provides valuable correctives to the views presented by Gisevius and Wheeler-Bennett, I am sure he would be the last to claim that he has said the final word on this agonizing subject. He has certainly succeeded in showing that there were a great many people in Germany who opposed Hitler and eventually even tried to remove him, but it can well be doubted whether it is possible to talk of a movement of resistance in the generally accepted sense. There were active centres of criticism, derived from a variety of moral, religious, political and economic positions; but it becomes once more abundantly clear that there was no integrated or even centrally directed resistance movement, and Goerdeler like Beck and Stauffenberg, who might be considered its outstanding representatives, retain that shadowy quality one expects in a nightmare.

Professor Ritter is far too honest an historian to try and give substance to these shadows. He makes no attempt to give anything else but what is most probably a completely truthful picture of Goerdeler as of a man who was absolutely honest, very brave and deeply conscious of the evil of Hitlerism. It becomes clear, however, as the story unfolds that, despite his great abilities as an administrator, he was not a political leader, that he was full of illusions, and that his qualities turned into defects in his superhuman task. Thus the deep moral convictions which had driven him into uncompromising opposition prevented him from sanctioning any attempt on Hitler's life, although as long as Hitler lived no conspiracy against him had the slightest chance of success. There is something naïve in his belief that if only he could talk to Hitler he could persuade him to do the right thing, but then there is something futile about the whole conspiracy. Some recent writers have tried to gloss over this futility by blaming the western Powers for the failure of the various plots which miscarried, and it has been suggested that if Chamberlain had not flown to Godesberg the German Generals would have removed Hitler. Professor Ritter makes no such claim but it must be regretted that he still gives the impression that such a General's *putsch* might have succeeded if Britain and France had remained firm in 1938, although on the evidence of the facts produced by him such a *putsch* was most improbable and would most certainly have failed. If the revolt failed in 1944 after Stalingrad and the débâcle in North Africa, when everybody except fanatical Nazi bosses knew the war to be lost, how could resistance have been successful in 1938 when

85 per cent of the German people were behind him and were dizzy with success? This is not the only inconsistency in Professor Ritter's account; another example is his treatment of the Polish question. Again he does not go so far as some recent German writers who have blamed Britain for having guaranteed Poland and thus prevented her from settling the problem of the Corridor peacefully; yet he does deplore the British guarantee and suggests that it stiffened the attitude of the Polish Government. We know now that Hitler was not interested in Danzig or the Corridor, and that whatever the unfortunate Poles would have done their fate was sealed as had been that of Czechoslovakia.

Professor Ritter brings home with an almost shattering clarity the terrible dilemma in which the German conspirators found themselves. As German patriots they were bound to rejoice in his successes, as opponents of Hitler they knew that every success would diminish their chances against him. During the war this dilemma became truly tragic, because so long as German arms were victorious any resistance was not only high treason but hopeless, although they might have counted on help from outside; when Germany's military fortunes turned, their internal chances rose but now Germany's enemies insisted on unconditional surrender. It is quite possible that future historians will consider the fateful decision of Casablanca as a great political blunder, but Professor Ritter fails to see or at least does not fully appreciate the fact that the western leaders were in a dilemma themselves. If they countenanced an internal revolt and came to terms with the rebels they ran the grave risk of helping to produce a new "*Dolchstoßlegende*" which they were understandably determined to avoid at all cost. Can they also really be blamed for distrusting rebels who said they could do nothing while Hitler was successful, and was it really so surprising that they suspected the rebels of being not so much against Hitler but against Hitler losing the war? Indeed it is quite possible to argue that if the revolt of 1944 had succeeded and Hitler had been assassinated many Germans today would feel that their defeat was not the result of his incompetence and madness but was in fact caused by the conspirators having stabbed him in the back while he was engaged on his historic task. Even as things have developed there are many Germans who consider the men of 1944 as traitors, and it is to be hoped that Professor Ritter's account will counteract such dangerous tendencies. It is possible that later generations will judge these momentous events as elements of a genuine tragedy. Perhaps one of the conspirators was right when he said that the German people had to drink the bitter cup to the dregs before they could be saved.

In reading this account of one of the most disastrous phases of German history we become deeply conscious of one fact for which the author provides no explanation. The conspirators failed, not because they were not brave enough or because they were constantly baulked by "insidious incident," but fundamentally because they did not have the people behind them. Professor Ritter does indeed give reasons for the triumph of Hitlerism in Germany which have often been brought forward, but even if we admit the validity of these we still feel that they do not tell the whole story. Thus the question which is the most important of all: why a great nation like the Germans who produced men like Goethe and Beethoven, Stein, and perhaps on a lower level Carl Goerdeler could follow a demented demagogue like Hitler, remains unanswered, and perhaps will only be fully answered by future generations of historians who can view these events with greater detachment than any of us, inside Germany or outside, are capable of today.

R. ARIS.

**"WHOSOEVER shall CALL
on the name of the Lord shall
be delivered."** (Joel ii. 32)

THE CALL FOR DIVINE DELIVERANCE

That ALMIGHTY GOD may deliver
and protect us from the menace of

SATANIC EVIL

and

ANGELIC ERROR

now combining in the effort to gain

WORLD DOMINION:

Use daily 'The Call' (The Prayer)
in the

'WHOSOEVER' LEAFLET

For information and free copies write to:

**THE PANACEA SOCIETY
BEDFORD**

Yes, of Course . . .

I know the Christian paper you want, if you are a reader of *The Contemporary Review*—you want a Christian weekly that regards you as an adult, responsible being, ready and willing to go to the root of the matter without humbugging around. Yes, I can recommend the one you want, the great old, reborn *British Weekly*. They'll send you specimen copies from

BRITISH WEEKLY

46-47, Chancery Lane,
London, W.C.2.

GERMAN PARLIAMENTS

*A study of the development of representative institutions
in Germany*

BY STEPHEN KING-HALL AND RICHARD K. ULLMANN

10s. 6d.

"... concise, readable and manifestly unbiased ..."

Manchester Guardian

"... contains many shrewd observations, useful tables and appendices, and well-selected illustrations."

Economist

"... a wealth of historical detail."

Tribune

Published by

THE HANSARD SOCIETY

39 Millbank, London, S.W.1

TYPEWRITERS

ADDING MACHINES - CALCULATORS

Bought Repaired Sold Hired

TAYLORS

THE CALCULATOR
SPECIALISTS

(Dept. 12), 74, Chancery Lane, London, W.C.2

Tel: HOL. 3793

European Coal and Steel Community

HENRY J. MERRY

Communist China's New Constitution

FRANKLIN W. HOUN

U.S. Policies in North Africa

LORNA H. HAHN

Webb-Pomerene Associations

HOBERT P. STURM

**Class Identification and Projection in
Voting Behaviour**

HEINZ EULAU

Cold War Tragedy

JAMES P. WARBURG

and other features offered by the

WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

Approximately 900 pages. Four dollars per volume
(\$5.00 abroad)

Send orders to the Editor, Professor F. B. Schick

**UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH**